

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

10 October 2007

To: AL ALAWI, MU'AZHAMZA A

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL ALAWI, MU'AZHAMZA A

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee stated that he traveled to Afghanistan in June 2001 due to a fatwa issued by a Sheikh.
    2. The Sheikh in the previous bullet was responsible for the jihadist movement in Yemen. The jihadist movement recognized Usama bin Laden as their leader.
    3. The detainee stated he traveled throughout the neighboring villages surrounding the city of Khowst, Afghanistan for six months, teaching poor and disadvantaged Muslims the Koran, and correcting their perceived errors in the faith and practice of rituals.
    4. After his original statement regarding his travel to Afghanistan, the detainee stated that he was ready to make a complete statement about his actions in Afghanistan. He stated that he lived in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia when he decided to go join the Taliban and fight the Northern Alliance.
    5. The detainee stated that he and his cousin decided to travel to Afghanistan to seek martyrdom fighting for their faith.

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6. The detainee claimed that he went to Yemen to make arrangements and flew from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee then traveled to Quetta, Pakistan, where he stayed for three days in a Taliban guest house. From there, Taliban fighters then took him across the border into Afghanistan. The detainee gave his passport to a guest house operator for safe keeping.
  7. The detainee stated that he was issued a Kalashnikov rifle, four magazines and two grenades at the Khalid Center and then transported to Omar Saif Center. At Omar Saif Center, he was assigned to a middle line position. He stayed there five to six months.
  8. A source observed the detainee fighting for the overall military leader in the Tora Bora mountains.
  9. A source identified that the detainee was a Mujahed for a long time, and stated that the detainee acted as Imam at a Kandahar, Afghanistan guest house. He held this position because he had memorized the Koran and knew it better than others at the guest house.
  10. A source identified the detainee by name and stated the detainee was a leader of a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- b. Training
1. The detainee stated he learned to use the AK-47 when he was 8 or 9 and claims to be a good marksman.
  2. The detainee claimed that he was driven in a Taliban vehicle to Khalid Center, near Bagram, Afghanistan. There he received several hours training in the operation and firing of rocket-propelled grenades, RPG. He fired one RPG during the training. He declined training on the Kalashnikov rifle, as he was already familiar from previous experience in Yemen.
  3. A source stated that he attended basic training with the detainee at the al Farouq training camp.
  4. The al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida and therefore was more advanced than the other camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, basic commando course, topography, and explosives.

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5. A Senior al Qaida operative, stated that the detainee had participated in the hand-to-hand combat training at Mes Aynak.
6. A source stated that basic trainees at the Aynak Training Camp, south of Kabul, Afghanistan, received weapons training on Kalashnikov rifles, PK Machine guns, Rocket Propelled Grenades, and Hand grenades. The trainees were taught how to perform maintenance on each weapon.
7. A source stated the detainee attended basic training at the Khalden Training Camp.
8. Khalden's program was a complete course about weapons. An entire six-month program at Khalden consisted of light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography, and a tactical course.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. Indications are that the detainee was a member of Usama bin Laden's security detail and the detainee was in Afghanistan for jihad and training.
2. A source claimed that the detainee was a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden, and stated that he personally saw the detainee with Usama bin Laden approximately one month before Ramadan.
3. An al Qaida operative stated that he met the detainee in 1998, in a small training camp in Khowst, Afghanistan, and also stated that the detainee was one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards.
4. A source observed the detainee standing watch at the entry gate to the Usama bin Laden compound at the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport.
5. The detainee was possibly at the Khaldan Camp in 1999, and knew a senior al Qaida lieutenant well enough to exchange greetings in 2000 and 2001.
6. The detainee claimed that he contacted his uncle, who thereafter contacted an individual to assist the detainee with his travels to Afghanistan.
7. The individual that assisted with the detainee's travels to Afghanistan was the head of the Islah Party and was a major shareholder in Sabaa Bank. The Sabaa bank was the main bank for channeling funds to Islamic Terrorists.

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8. The detainee's name was listed in a document identifying al Qaida Mujahedin and the contents of their trust accounts recovered during raids against al Qaida associated safe houses in Pakistan.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. A source stated three individuals accompanied Usama bin Laden when he left Tora Bora, Afghanistan and thirty others departed the area afterwards headed for Pakistan. The detainee was among these thirty individuals and was arrested crossing the Pakistan border on 15 December 2001.
2. A source identified the detainee as a Mujahedin who was captured at Tora Bora, Afghanistan.

### 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee denied any affiliation with al Qaida and indicated he never saw or was in the presence of Usama bin Laden or any other high ranking al Qaida personnel.
- b. The detainee denied having any previous knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11th and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States' Interests.
- c. The detainee denied he served as a body guard for Usama bin Laden.
- d. The detainee claims never to have been a member of the Taliban, nor fought against the Northern Alliance's forces.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

26 November 2007

To: AL MUJAHID, MAHMUD A

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUJAHID, MAHMUD A

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee was identified as the emir of a guesthouse at the airport village in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
    - 2) An individual who has sat with Usama bin Laden more than ten times stated the detainee was a bodyguard and stated that the bodyguards were given specialized training at al Farouq.
    - 3) The detainee was identified as becoming a bodyguard shortly after the USS Cole bombing and remained a guard for one year until they all withdrew to Tora Bora, Afghanistan. The detainee's older brother, who was a veteran bodyguard, was identified as bringing the detainee to the Usama bin Laden guard force.
    - 4) A source identified the detainee as a member of Usama bin Laden's guard force.
    - 5) A source stated he saw the detainee several times with Usama bin Laden between October 2001 and November 2001 in Kabul, Khowst, and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
    - 6) An al Qaida facilitator stated the detainee followed his brother into al Qaida. The al Qaida facilitator stated the detainee's brother facilitated his recruitment as a bodyguard

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for Usama bin Laden.

- 7) A source stated he saw the detainee with Usama bin Laden on three different occasions between April 2001 and November 2001. The source believes the detainee was one of Usama bin Laden's closest bodyguards due to the fact every time he saw Usama bin Laden the detainee was close by.
  - 8) The detainee stated he studied religion under a Sheikh from Yemen for a period of three months.
  - 9) According to a Yemeni national, the Sheikh from Yemen was recruiting Yemeni youth from small villages. The Yemeni youth were being indoctrinated into the radical Salafi sect of Islam, and instilled with a profound hatred toward the west.
  - 10) The detainee was identified as being facilitated to Afghanistan in late 1999 or early 2000. The detainee's brother was also identified as having his trip facilitated to Afghanistan circa 1997 to 1998.
  - 11) A driver for Usama bin Laden identified the detainee as one of the individuals from the group that was apprehended at the Pakistan boarder. The driver stated the detainee was a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.
  - 12) The detainee stated he then attended the Islamic institute in Ma'reb, Yemen where the detainee had been told he should go to Afghanistan to teach the Koran.
  - 13) The detainee stated he and another individual arrived in Karachi, Pakistan. After five days the three of the detainee boarded a bus and traveled to Quetta, Pakistan. After arriving in Pakistan, the detainee was driven in a public car to the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The detainee stated he crossed the border on foot, and then 5 days later the detainee traveled to Kandahar.
- b) Training
- 1) A source stated he first saw the detainee at al Farouq in May or June of 2000, and later heard the detainee became a guard for Usama bin Laden.
  - 2) The detainee was identified as not being convinced of fighting against the Northern Alliance while he was training at al Farouq, was hesitant, and did not know whether to go to the Islamic Institute in Kandahar, Afghanistan or to go to the front lines to fight.
  - 3) A senior al Qaida operative stated al Farouq training camp took 45 days and was a basic training course that covered all types of topics, such as weapons, topography, field guns,

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first aid, and explosives.

- 4) The detainee's name was listed on a roster recovered from the military committee of the al-Mujahedin office. The detainee was included on list that contained sixteen students that had graduated on September 10, 2000 from al Qaida basics course.

### **c) Connections/Associations**

- 1) The detainee was identified as being at the Nibras guesthouse, Kabul, Afghanistan, Tora Bora, Afghanistan and in the al Farouq training camp. The detainee was identified as moving with Usama bin Laden when he departed.
- 2) Two guesthouses were identified in Kandahar, Afghanistan. One was for the common people and other one was called the al Nibras guesthouse which was for the special people, that included those en-route to the al Farouq training camp and Usama bin Laden.
- 3) An individual who has sat with Usama bin Laden more than ten times stated the detainee was always with Usama bin Laden in Kabul, Afghanistan, Kandahar, Afghanistan, and al Farouq and described him as a good fighter. The individual also stated the detainee carried a Kalashnikov rifle.

### **d) Other Relevant Data**

- 1) A source stated he saw Usama bin Laden in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan. After Usama bin Laden left Tora Bora, the source left with 30 individuals who attempted to cross the border into Pakistan. The source identified the detainee as one of the 30 individuals he was captured with while attempting to cross the border into Pakistan. Several of these individuals are thought to have been bodyguards for Usama bin Laden.
- 2) A source who was part of the thirty individuals captured near Parachinar, Pakistan while fleeing Afghanistan, stated the Pakistani warden told the group the best thing they could tell the United States forces when interrogated was they were in Afghanistan to teach the Koran and for religious studies.
- 3) The detainee was identified as knowing about future operations.
- 4) The detainee was identified as using a cover story that he was a religious teacher in Afghanistan.

### **4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:**

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- a) The detainee stated he heard from various Yemeni religious leaders of the religious ignorance in Afghanistan and was motivated to travel to Afghanistan to teach the Koran.
  - b) The detainee denied participating in any fighting or receiving any weapons training either before or during his trip to Afghanistan. The detainee denied knowing the locations of any terrorist training camps.
  - c) The detainee stated his brother, Riyadh, had never been to Afghanistan, and was not affiliated with al Qaida or the Taliban.
  - d) The detainee denied attending al Farouq training camp and denied ever participating in any military training while in Afghanistan. The detainee denied being an Usama bin Laden body guard and denied swearing bayat to Usama bin Laden.
  - e) The detainee denies any prior knowledge of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and also denies hearing any rumors concerning such attacks.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 December 2007

To: IDRIS, MAHMUD A

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IDRIS, MAHMUD A

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated his motive to go to Afghanistan was Dawa and to teach the Koran to the Afghani children. The detainee stated he studied the Koran at a mosque in Yemen.
    - 2) The detainee stated he traveled with his Sudanese passport and obtained a visa in Khartoum, Sudan, in order to travel into Afghanistan. The detainee stated he traveled to Karachi, Pakistan, via Qatar Airlines with 1,000 United States Dollars. The detainee stated he then took a bus to Quetta, Pakistan, and then used his Sudanese passport to gain entry into Afghanistan. The detainee stated he made his way to Kandahar, Afghanistan, and spent five days in a government guest house. The detainee stated he asked where the frontline of fighting was taking place and was told the frontline was in Bagram, Afghanistan.
    - 3) The detainee stated an individual who worked as a senior member of the al Wafa relief organization sent him to the villages in Khowst, Afghanistan, where he taught. The detainee stated he stayed in Khowst for approximately four months.
    - 4) The detainee was at a guest house for Arabs in Afghanistan circa 1999. The detainee was a very experienced doctor. The detainee was on the Taliban front. The detainee oversaw all the wounded who returned from the fighting with the Northern Alliance Forces.

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### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IDRIS, MAHMUD A

- 5) The detainee stated he fought with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance prior to the start of the United States bombing of Afghanistan. The detainee stated he has killed people in battle while attacking or being attacked by the Northern Alliance.
- 6) The detainee was on the front lines of Kandahar or Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 7) The detainee was a field doctor who served on the front lines while fighting in Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
- b) Training
  - 1) The detainee stated he trained on the Kalashnikov, Beka machine gun, and mortars at the al Farouq Camp.
  - 2) The detainee stated he was the clinical doctor at al Farouq Camp in Afghanistan.
  - 3) The detainee was identified as having been at al Farouq at the clinic treating people.
  - 4) The detainee was identified as a respected camp leader who had his own weapon. The detainee had the authority to attend meetings with the camp leadership.
  - 5) The detainee was identified as a doctor and a fighter in Afghanistan. The detainee provided medical care to trainees who were injured at al Farouq.
  - 6) The detainee was identified as the doctor at the al Farouq Camp. The detainee was seen carrying around an AK-47 at al Farouq Camp.
  - 7) The detainee stated his treatment of patients consisted of treating mostly cold and flu symptoms and minor injuries sustained during training.
  - 8) The detainee stated he could not remember the year, but spent six months at al Farouq Camp. The detainee stated he lived in a house which was also the clinic near the mosque at al Farouq.
  - 9) The detainee was identified as having worked at al Farouq as a pharmacist and medic. The detainee also dispensed first aid to students.

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF IDRIS, MAHMUD A**

10) The detainee was identified as having been in charge of the medical clinic at the al Farouq Training Camp.

### **c) Connections/Associations**

- 1) The detainee was a member of al Qaida since the early 1990's and was known to have some medical expertise.
- 2) The detainee worked for al Qaida as a doctor. The detainee was both on the front lines in Afghanistan and in an al Qaida Camp in 1993 attending to the injured.
- 3) The detainee was a very experienced doctor on the Taliban front. The detainee was overseeing all wounded from the fighting with Northern Alliance Forces.
- 4) The detainee was a Sudanese who taught first aid at al Farouq.
- 5) The detainee stated Usama bin Laden visited al Farouq camp on one or two occasions. The detainee stated he spoke to Usama bin Laden and shook his hand inside the clinic.
- 6) The detainee was on the front lines in Kabul, Afghanistan, during battles with the Northern Alliance. The detainee trained in the camps in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and was with Usama bin Laden during Tora Bora, Afghanistan in late 2001.
- 7) The detainee was identified as an interrogator who worked for the Taliban and for al Qaida in Afghanistan.
- 8) The detainee was identified as having been on the Taliban front lines. The detainee was a doctor on the Taliban front lines and was also in charge of a house there.
- 9) The detainee was identified as having been known as the doctor for the Arabs.

### **d) Other Relevant Data**

- 1) The detainee stated he arrived in Afghanistan in October 2001 carrying 5,000 United States Dollars.
- 2) The detainee claimed Yemeni citizenship but later stated he was in fact Sudanese.

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- 3) The detainee stated he was in Bagram, Afghanistan when the United States started bombing.
  - 4) The detainee was identified in the Tora Bora, Afghanistan area. The detainee arrived with nine trucks full of fighters.
  - 5) The detainee was identified as part of a group of thirty individuals who were captured crossing the border into Pakistan.
  - 6) A source stated the detainee tells other detainees not to talk and/or collaborate with the interrogators.
  - 7) The detainee expressed how he did not know how bad al Farouq training camp was until now because he is detained for having been there.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
  - b) The detainee stated that he never traveled to Afghanistan and that any and all information from other persons indicating that he was in Afghanistan are lies.
  - c) The detainee denied being at Camp al Farouq, Afghanistan and serving as the camp doctor.
  - d) The detainee denied ever meeting Usama bin Laden and membership in al Qaida.
  - e) The detainee denied his involvement in the Mujahedin and its fight with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
  - f) The detainee insisted that he was never any sort of doctor and knew nothing about medicine.
  - g) The detainee denied being a member of al Qaida and having any nicknames.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 December 2007

To: AL MUDHAFFARI, ABDELQADIR H

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUDHAFFARI, ABDELQADIR H

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he moved to Sanaa, Yemen when he was twenty. The detainee stated he attended the Dimaj Institute in Sanaa, Yemen for two years. Sheik Muqbil al Wadi was one of his instructors at the Dimaj Institute. The detainee stated he went to learn more about the Koran and Islam from Sheik Muqbil al Wadi.
    - 2) The detainee stated he learned of the conditions in Afghanistan and its need for Arabic teachers of the Koran through his studies with Sheikh Muqbil al Wadi.
    - 3) The detainee stated he wanted a jihad and chose to travel to Afghanistan.
    - 4) The detainee stated he met with an individual at the Dimaj Institute and told him of his idea and travel plans to Afghanistan. The detainee stated the individual decided to help the detainee plan his travel. The detainee stated the individual told him about a mosque in Karachi, Pakistan that would give him shelter and arrange his travel into Afghanistan.
    - 5) The detainee stated he left Sanaa, Yemen for Karachi, Pakistan in November 2000 and traveled alone. The detainee stated he stayed in Karachi, Pakistan for one day and then took a bus to Quetta, Pakistan. In Quetta, Pakistan the detainee told the Taliban Office he wanted to enter Afghanistan to teach the Koran. The detainee stated the office agreed to help him. The detainee stated he traveled with approximately \$400-\$500 United States

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dollars.

- 6) The detainee stated he took a bus from Quetta, Pakistan to Qandahar (Kandahar), Afghanistan. The detainee stated he went to the Jihadia School, an Islamic studies school, while in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 7) The detainee stated an individual at the Jihadia School told him he should go to Khowst, Afghanistan to teach the Koran.
- 8) The detainee was a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden for a short time.
- 9) The detainee was a weapons instructor at the al Matar training camp and served as a bodyguard when he accompanied Usama bin Laden to Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 10) The detainee was a trainer at al Farouq.
- 11) The detainee was identified as being a trainer at an advanced training course. The detainee taught topography and weapons use to all the classes at the advanced training camp.
- 12) The detainee was identified as an Usama bin Laden security bodyguard.
- 13) The detainee was identified as being at Mullah Omar's compound about three years ago.

#### b) Training

- 1) The al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan has been identified as having been funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography, and explosives.
- 2) The detainee was at the al Farouq Training Camp in 1999.

#### c) Other Relevant Data

- 1) The detainee stated he remained in Khowst, Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, but eventually received word that all Arabs were leaving Afghanistan because it was feared the Arabs would be associated with Usama bin Laden so he decided to head for the Pakistani border.

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUDHAFFARI, ABDELQADIR H**

- 2) The detainee stated he trekked through the mountains back to the Pakistani border with 30 other Arabs and Afghan guides.
- 3) The detainee was identified as being detained while trying to cross into Pakistan from Afghanistan in December 2001 with a group of 30 Arabs.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a) The detainee stated he was called to go to Afghanistan to teach the Koran and was not recruited by anyone. The detainee stated the Taliban did not recruit him to fight in the war against America. The detainee stated his decision to go to Afghanistan was to spread the truth to the people of Afghanistan. The detainee stated he never fought in the Afghan war against anyone.
  - b) The detainee stated he felt the attacks on the World Trade Center and the other attacks in America that day were wrong. The detainee stated Islam did not permit people to kill innocent people and it was wrong to declare war on them.
  - c) The detainee stated he has never heard of Usama bin Laden's fatwa against the United States and claimed he never met Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated he had no association with the Taliban or al Qaida.
  - d) The detainee stated it is against his religion to lie.
  - e) The detainee denied any association with the Taliban or al Qaida forces. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

05 December 2007

To: ABDU AHMED, MAJID M

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDU AHMED, MAJID M

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he first learned of jihad in Afghanistan at the Fargan Institute in Taizz, Yemen and then wanted to fight with the Taliban. He also heard about jihad from the Mosque where he prayed and fell in love with the idea of dying for the sake of God.
    - 2) The detainee stated that towards the end of 1999 he decided to go to Afghanistan. He felt it was his duty to teach people.
    - 3) The detainee stated he needed a fatwa before going to Afghanistan so he telephoned Sheikh al Wadi, a supporter of the Taliban and jihad. The detainee asked Sheikh al Wadi what he thought of jihad in Afghanistan, and Sheikh al Wadi told him it was a good thing for Muslims to go fight jihad. The detainee stated he received his fatwa from Sheikh al Wadi and then decided on jihad in Afghanistan.
    - 4) The detainee stated while in Yemen he was told to tell the Taliban fighters he wanted to fight with the Afghans. This request would allow him to skip training other Arabs were required to take before they went to the front lines.
    - 5) The detainee stated he traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan by airplane. The detainee stated he then traveled to the Taliban office in Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDO AHMED, MAJID M**

stated he traveled to the Afghanistan border by car with several other Afghans. The detainee stated he crossed the border into Afghanistan and got into another car to travel to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

- 6) The detainee stated he arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan and stayed at a Taliban safe house. The house was known to support Taliban fighters who would travel back and forth to the front line. The detainee stated he met the owner of the Kandahar safe house and told the owner he was here to fight jihad with Afghans and support the Taliban. The detainee stated the owner told him he would take the detainee to Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 7) The detainee stated he met an individual who took him to a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he lived at the guest house while he studied and taught the Koran at a mosque in Khowst, Afghanistan.
- 8) The detainee stated he stayed at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan for approximately 22 months. The detainee described his daily routine there as praying and traveling around to the local mosques teaching the Koran.
- 9) The detainee was in Kandahar, Afghanistan before September 2001 when the detainee was serving as one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards. The detainee was present in his capacity as Usama bin Laden's bodyguard both at the guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan and Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee was at Usama bin Laden's Compound Number Six in Kandahar, Afghanistan before 11 September 2001.
- 10) The Mall Six Compound housed Usama bin Laden, his four wives and respective families, and approximately ten to fifteen bodyguards and their families. The compound was also used for meetings with al Qaida officials.
- 11) The detainee was a bodyguard just before September 2001. The detainee was in Tora Bora, Afghanistan before the withdrawal from Kabul, Afghanistan started.
- 12) A source reported he heard the detainee became a guard for Usama bin Laden one month before 11 September 2001.
- 13) The detainee was identified as being with the group of bodyguards that were with Usama bin Laden before he disappeared in Tora Bora. The detainee was on the Kabul front lines in January 2001.
- 14) The detainee was identified as going to Afghanistan in late 1999 or early 2000 and joining the guard force around August 2001.

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### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDU AHMED, MAJID M

- 15) The detainee was identified as spending time at the Hamza al Qaeeti guest house when the detainee arrived in Afghanistan.
- 16) The detainee was identified as being in Kandahar and Kabul, Afghanistan with other Usama bin Laden security guards, but was not a known UBL security guard.
- 17) The detainee was identified as an Usama bin Laden bodyguard and was usually by Usama bin Laden's side.
- 18) The detainee was identified as being at the Madafa in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 19) Al Qaida maintained a safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan which was used as transit housing for individuals fighting with al Qaida or Taliban forces, as well as a residence for Arabs coming to Afghanistan to receive al Qaida training. The house was referred to as the Mudafa.
- 20) The detainee was one of the Yemeni al Qaida members believed to be in Afghanistan as of 15 December 2001.
- 21) The detainee stated he fought with the Taliban in a jihad. He carried a Kalashnikov rifle during the fighting and fired rounds.
- 22) The detainee stated he fought for the Taliban the two years he was in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated his enemy while with the Taliban was Ahmed Shah Masoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance. The detainee would engage the enemy two to three times a week with rifle and mortar fire. The detainee is unsure if he injured or killed anyone since the fighting was done from a great distance. The detainee stated his duty at the front line was to protect the front line from attacks by the Northern Alliance. The detainee stated he would remain in a sandbag bunker with his weapon and binoculars to watch for attacks. Also in the bunker was additional ammunition for the fighters.
- 23) The detainee's name appears on an al Qaida recruitment application.

#### b) Training

- 1) The detainee stated he left Yemen in 1999 to fight in Afghanistan. He stated he received rifle training in Yemen and knew how to fire and field strip a weapon. The detainee stated he did not receive grenade training until he reached the front lines with the Taliban.
- 2) The detainee was at the Farouq camp in Khowst, Afghanistan in 1999.

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- 3) Al Farouq training was conducted in four phases, including small arms, physical, map reading and topography, and explosive devices.
- 4) The detainee was identified as being at al Farouq.
- c) Connections/Associations
  - 1) The detainee stated he studied the Koran in Yemen with a Sheik who studied under Sheik Muqbil al Wadi.
  - 2) The detainee was identified as possibly being with Soukali at the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport in October 2001. Soukali served as a bodyguard during a speech by Usama bin Laden.
- d) Intent
  - 1) The detainee stated he hated America and Americans as he was unjustly incarcerated.
  - 2) The detainee stated Usama bin Laden is a Sheikh and commander of all Muslims. He is a good Muslim and fights against the unbelievers. The detainee stated he has never met or spoken with Usama bin Laden, but he would be honored to meet him. The detainee stated the attack on America on 11 Sep 2001 was very small in scale and he wishes for greater destruction and torture to fall upon Americans. He stated he hates Americans because they are all infidels and corrupt.
- e) Other Relevant Data
  - 1) The detainee stated he received word that all Arabs were leaving Afghanistan because it was feared the Arabs would be associated with Usama bin Laden. He contacted an individual who located an Afghani guide to take him to the Pakistan border. The detainee stated upon arrival at the Pakistan border he was arrested by Pakistanis.
  - 2) The detainee was identified as being among a group of thirty Arabs who were detained while trying to cross into Pakistan in December 2001.
  - 3) The detainee stated he created the cover story during his escape from Afghanistan into Pakistan when he met some friends from Yemen. The detainee stated he said they were in Afghanistan to teach the Koran. The detainee stated his story was false.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

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- a) The detainee stated he heard of Usama bin Laden's fatwa against the United States in the news, but he never met Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated had no association with al Qaida and never attended any training camps. The detainee stated he never been trained to fight and if he was going to fight he would have joined the army in Yemen. The detainee stated he felt the attack on the World Trade Center was wrong because Islam did not permit people to kill innocent people and it was wrong to declare war on innocent people.
  - b) The detainee stated he never personally studied under Sheikh al Wadi, but recalls seeing him when he was about fifteen years old at the "big mosque" in Aden. The detainee stated he never stayed at the Madafa house in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he never learned of the existence of any military camps or facilities in the Kabul area. The detainee stated he had no association or affiliation with the Taliban or al Qaida.
  - c) The detainee stated he was not a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden and has never seen him.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

09 January 2008

To: SHALABI, ABDUL R

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHALABI, ABDUL R

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he left Medina, Saudi Arabia in approximately 1999 or 2000. The detainee stated he received the equivalent of three thousand United States dollars from his family for his trip to Afghanistan, and traveled by plane to Pakistan.
    - 2) The detainee left Saudi Arabia in 1997 for Bahrain and did not return.
    - 3) The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan alone. The detainee stated he flew from Medina to Zahran, Saudi Arabia, then to Bahrain, then to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated he flew from Karachi, Pakistan to Peshawar, Pakistan, and then drove to Torkhom, Pakistan on the border to Afghanistan. The detainee stated he traveled by bus to Jalalabad then his final destination of Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he was taken to a mosque in Khowst, Afghanistan by an Egyptian named Abu Suliman.
    - 4) Abu Suliman was the head Director of a camp in Duranta. The camp's training consisted of light arms and explosives training.
    - 5) The detainee stated he decided to leave Khowst, Afghanistan to return to Saudi Arabia in approximately December 2001.
    - 6) The detainee stated he escaped Khowst, Afghanistan with his nephew and joined a group of 30 Arabs and Yemenis escaping Afghanistan.

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### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SHALABI, ABDUL R

- 7) The detainee stated he identified himself as a Saudi citizen and asked to be taken to the Saudi Embassy. The detainee stated the Pakistani guard took him to a holding facility in Peshawar, Pakistan where he was held for one week. The detainee stated met with a representative of the Saudi Embassy, and was subsequently transferred to United States authorities.
  - 8) The detainee went to Afghanistan at the end of 1998 and joined Usama bin Laden's security detail in 1999. The detainee was with Usama bin Laden until Tora Bora.
  - 9) The detainee was in the al Farouq camp in Khowst, Afghanistan in 1998 and later on in 2000-2001 when the detainee was working as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.
  - 10) The detainee was one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards in Afghanistan.
  - 11) The detainee was identified as coming to Afghanistan circa 1997 and becoming a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden after 1998.
  - 12) The detainee was identified with Usama bin Laden at a stone house while the detainee and Usama bin Laden were on their way to the Ktal region of Tora Bora.
  - 13) The detainee was ready to be a martyr in the Southeast Asia part of the September 11, 2001 operation.
  - 14) The detainee's name was found on a letter written from a senior al Qaida operative found on a hard drive associated with another senior al Qaida operative.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee underwent guerilla warfare training at al Farouq. The detainee was injured in the 1998 attack on terrorist camps by United States Forces. The detainee fought on the front lines in the late 1990's.
  - 2) The detainee was identified as being in the al Farouq training camp when it was bombed by Coalition Forces and was identified as being seriously wounded in the back and shoulder by shrapnel.
  - 3) The al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography, and explosives.

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- 4) The detainee was identified as attending Khalden camp.
  - 5) Khalden was a training camp near Khowst, Afghanistan that taught basic weapons, artillery, military tactics, and topography.
  - 6) Missile strikes on al Qaida's Khowst camp forced the detainee's group to relocate to another camp near Kabul, Afghanistan in 1998. The detainee was identified as one of Usama bin Laden's bodyguards whom Usama bin Laden personally selected to enroll in a commando course.
  - 7) Trainees at the Aynak training camp located south of Kabul, Afghanistan received training on Kalashnikov rifles, PK machine guns, RPGs and Russian hand grenades.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee was identified as being with Usama bin Laden in Kabul and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  - 2) The detainee was identified as being related to another bodyguard for Usama bin Ladin. This bodyguard was married to one of Usama bin Ladin's daughters.
  - 3) The detainee was identified as being present at an operational meeting with a senior al Qaida lieutenant in Karachi, Pakistan.
  - 4) The detainee was identified as teaching at a madrasa located in Kandahar, Afghanistan that was funded by Taliban leader Mullah Omar and Taliban police Chief Hafif Majid.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee denied he traveled to Afghanistan at the direction of, or with the permission of, any group or organization, to include the Taliban or al Qaida. The detainee denied any knowledge of any terrorist training camps in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, or elsewhere. The detainee denied any affiliation with any groups or organizations, including al Qaida or any other terrorist organizations. The detainee denied knowing anyone affiliated with al Qaida and stated that he does not know of any individuals incarcerated with him who are affiliated with al Qaida or the Taliban.
  - b) The detainee stated he made one trip to Kabul, Afghanistan to make a telephone call to his family.

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- c) The detainee was identified as teaching over 300 men at a madrasa in Khandahar, Afghanistan and was very well known.
  - d) The detainee stated he did not agree with the killing of civilians, as it is against Islamic law and his religion would never condone such an act. The detainee stated Usama bin Laden was a "murderer".
  - e) The detainee stated he never received any weapons or military training in his life.
  - f) The detainee stated he does not know anyone who knows, or works for, Usama bin Laden or the bin Laden family. He stated he has never met or heard Usama bin Laden speak.
  - g) The detainee stated he did not see any Taliban while in Khowst, Afghanistan.
  - h) A small scar was observed on the detainees left arm. The detainee explained he got in a car accident when he was seventeen. He also has scars on his back and head from the same accident.
  - j) When asked how he taught the children without speaking the same language, the detainee stated he taught children in the madrasa how to read the Koran in Arabic, but it was up to the children's parents to explain the meanings of the Koran because he could not speak their language.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 November 2007

To: AL HASAN, SAMIR N

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HASAN, SAMIR N

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee stated he considered joining Jamat-al-Tabligh during the time he attended a Mosque in Taiz, Yemen.
    2. Jamat-al-Tabligh is a known supporter of Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia, Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network. Usama bin Laden has used Jamat-al-Tabligh to communicate instructions to his network of organizations.
    3. The detainee stated a childhood friend and neighbor, recruited him to go to Afghanistan. The detainee stated his recruiter offered him goods, pay, a house, a wife, and a good life if he would go to Afghanistan.
    4. The detainee stated his recruiter told him they could live a simple life in Afghanistan and make more money, so they decided travel to Afghanistan to fight in the jihad.
    5. The detainee stated he and his recruiter flew from Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan, and stayed for two days before they took a bus to Korta, Pakistan. Once in Korta, the detainee and his recruiter traveled by bus to Kandahar, Afghanistan. In

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Kandahar, the detainee stayed at a guest house.

6. The detainee was identified as being in a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where the detainee was responsible for food in the guest house.
7. The detainee was identified as being at a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
8. The detainee was identified as being among a group of 30 al Qaida members who were captured together. The detainee was identified as being at a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
9. The detainee was identified in a photo as a person at the madafa in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
10. The detainee stated he and his recruiter traveled from Kandahar to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated in Kabul, Afghanistan, he and his recruiter stayed at a house owned by the Taliban for approximately one week.
11. The detainee stated he and his recruiter traveled north of Kabul, Afghanistan, to a military camp approximately two miles from the front line fighting with the Northern Alliance. Upon their arrival at the camp, the detainee was issued a Kalashnikov rifle and provided a jacket that held ammunition and weapons.
12. The detainee stated he went to the front lines to stay in good with the Taliban.
13. The detainee stated he did not receive any training in Afghanistan but went straight to the front line where he received a Kalashnikov.
14. The detainee stated he would stay on the front lines for five or six days at a time before returning to Kabul, Afghanistan.
15. The detainee was identified as coming to Afghanistan circa 1999 or 2000 and becoming a bodyguard in August 2001. The detainee possibly traveled to Tora Bora, Afghanistan.
16. The detainee was identified as being from Tora Bora, Afghanistan, where the detainee was a front line fighter in Bagram, Afghanistan.
17. The detainee stated after the American bombing campaign started, he retreated to Kabul, Afghanistan and then to Khowst, Afghanistan.

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18. The detainee stated he joined the Sadiq Unit in Afghanistan where he served as a foot soldier.

### b. Training

1. The detainee stated he was trained on the Kalashnikov rifle in Yemen, prior to his travel to Afghanistan. The detainee stated that every Friday for about four weeks, he practiced static marksmanship specifically for the trip to Afghanistan. The detainee stated, based upon the training, he felt fully competent in going to the front lines in Afghanistan and it was unnecessary to attend any training camps in Afghanistan.
2. The detainee was identified as having attended training at al Farouq, Afghanistan.
3. The al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan was funded by al Qaida and was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan. The training at al Farouq consists of two week periods of weapons training, a basic commando course, topography, and explosives.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated the detainee told the source the detainee was a soldier for the Taliban.
2. A source stated the detainee became a bodyguard circa August 2001.
3. The detainee stated he worked in Afghanistan as a relief worker for the Islamic Relief Organization.
4. The International Islamic Relief Organization was identified as an Islamic humanitarian organization with headquarters in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, and is financed by Usama bin Laden.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he traveled with an Afghan guide to Najar, Pakistan, and turned himself in at the Pakistan border.
2. The detainee stated he told the Pakistani police he worked with Islamic Relief.
3. As of 21 December 2001, the detainee was in custody in Peshawar, Pakistan. The detainee was among a large group of Saudi and Yemeni nationals captured while

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attempting to escape from Afghanistan into Pakistan. Most of the prisoners were captured in the Northern Kurram area directly across the Pakistani border from the Tora Bora region.

4. The detainee was identified from a photograph as one of the thirty individuals who fled to Pakistan and surrendered to Pakistani authorities.
5. The detainee stated he came to Afghanistan for employment and to start a family.

### 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated when he gets released, he would like to return to Yemen and get his previous job back, which was working at a factory.
- b. The detainee stated he has never taken a bayat.
- c. The detainee stated he did not support the fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance because Islam prohibits Muslims from fighting each other.
- d. The detainee stated he never engaged in battle with Northern Alliance or American troops while in Afghanistan.
- e. The detainee denies making a statement about traveling to the front lines on a regular basis, and being gone for five to six days at a time.
- f. The detainee stated he has never been to al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan and does not know anyone who attended the al Farouq camp.
- g. The detainee stated the Islamic Relief Organization was not affiliated with Usama bin Laden or al Qaida, nor did he have any knowledge of any organization who did sponsor them.
- h. The detainee stated he was not involved with al Qaida, and had not heard of it before his trip to Afghanistan.
- i. The detainee stated he was not a member of the Taliban.
- j. The detainee stated he is not willing to do anything for Usama bin Laden and stated he does not know Usama bin Laden.

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- k. A source stated he never heard of the detainee being a bodyguard, nor was he aware of the detainee's activities after al Farouq, Afghanistan.
  - l. The detainee stated he has no enemies, that he likes everyone, and he considers Americans friends.
  - m. The detainee stated he desired to return to Yemen, but his recruiter ignored the detainee's request. The detainee stated he had no money to leave the country.
  - n. The detainee stated he felt his recruiter used the money issue as leverage to try and convince him to fight for the Taliban. The detainee stated he would have received money for fighting with the Taliban, but since he did not believe in Muslims fighting each other, he could not bring himself to fight, and thus, he had no source of income to pay for his travel back to Yemen.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 January 2008

To: AHMED, MOHAMMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QOSI, IBRAHIM AHMED MAHMOUD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he worked as an accountant for the TABA company where he was in charge of the safe and company bank accounts for more than one year. The detainee stated other responsibilities included currency exchange from Sudanese pounds into American dollars. The detainee stated TABA was a subsidiary of Wadi al Aqiq. Wadi al Aqiq was owned by Usama bin Laden.
    - 2) The detainee stated he became an official member of al Qaida. He never took an oath of loyalty, a Bayat.
    - 3) The detainee stated he flew from Khartoum to Abu Dhabi then flew to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated he stayed at a guest house for two days in Peshawar, Pakistan. The detainee stated he traveled by automobile to the Farouq Camp.
    - 4) The detainee stated he was deployed to the Mujahedin front line near Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that after five or six months, Khowst fell and he then deployed to fight in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he stayed there for five or six months.
    - 5) The detainee stated Jalalabad fell in December 1991, at which time he returned to Sudan for an opportunity to work for a company owned by Usama bin Laden. The detainee

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## **UNCLASSIFIED**

### **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QOSI, IBRAHIM AHMED MAHMOUD**

stated UBL opened the Taba commercial company in Khartoum in 1992. The detainee was the treasurer/accountant for Taba. The detainee was a certified accountant for less than a year. The detainee stated he subsequently entered sales for the Taba Company.

- 6) The detainee stated he went to the Soba Farm on different occasions which was a place where Usama bin Laden went for recreation and horse back riding.
- 7) The detainee stated that in 1993 or 1994 Usama bin Laden sent him to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The detainee stated a senior al Qaida operative gave him five to seven thousand dollars (US) in an envelope. The detainee stated he was given instructions on how to make contact with the receiver of the money in Addis Ababa. The detainee stated he understood the instructions came ultimately from Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated once in Ababa, he followed the instructions and gave the money to the unknown man.
- 8) The detainee stated that in mid 1995, he wrote a letter to Usama bin Laden requesting to go to Chechnya in order to fight in the jihad. The detainee stated he traveled from Khartoum to Damascus, Syria then to Halab, Syria then to Baku and finally to Chechnya.
- 9) The detainee stated he was in southern Chechnya and stayed in two different villages. The detainee stated he used an M-43 120mm mortar while in combat. He remained in Chechnya for almost one year before traveling back to Pakistan. The detainee stated he went to Pakistan in order to join Usama bin Laden.
- 10) The detainee stated that in 1996, he was smuggled across the border by an Afghan into Jalalabad. The detainee stated he was told Usama bin Laden was in the Tora Bora Mountains. The detainee stated he was taken from Jalalabad to Tora Bora. The detainee stated he met with Usama bin Laden and they talked about Chechnya.
- 11) The detainee stated he lived in the compound of Usama bin Laden which was located outside of Jalalabad during late 1996 and 1997.
- 12) The detainee stated he worked in the kitchen of Usama bin Laden's compound in both Jalalabad and Kandahar in 1997.
- 13) The detainee stated around the time of the embassy bombings, he went to the front lines north of Kabul. The detainee stated he went back and forth between the front lines and Kandahar to assist in the jihad outside Kabul. The detainee stated he fought approximately one to one and one-half years. The detainee stated while at the front lines he was part of a defensive mortar crew where he used the M-43 120mm mortar.

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QOSI, IBRAHIM AHMED MAHMOUD

- 14) The detainee stated he returned to Kandahar to get married. The detainee stated he and his wife took residence at the airport compound of Usama bin Laden.
  - 15) The detainee stated he was directed by a senior al Qaida operative to travel to the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan. The detainee stated he and seventy to one hundred people were traveling to Pakistan when they came under fire from an Apache helicopter. The detainee stated that the armed members of his group gave their weapons to Pakistani tribes along the border in payment for safe passage. The tribes turned them over to Pakistani officials for arrest.
  - 16) The detainee was identified as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden prior to Sept 11, 2001 and would often cook for the other guards.
  - 17) The detainee was identified as a bodyguard and sometimes a driver for Usama bin Laden and likely knew other senior al Qaida operatives.
  - 18) The detainee was identified as being at Usama bin Laden's Kandahar compound. The detainee was identified as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden including time in Tora Bora when Usama bin Laden escaped from US forces.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated during his training at Farouq Camp, he was trained on the following weapons: Makarov 9mm Pistol, Seminov, AK-47, RPG-7, RGD-5 Offensive hand Grenade, F-1 Anti-personnel Grenade and the M-43 120mm Mortar.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee stated he first met Usama bin Laden at a guest house in Khartoum, Sudan.
  - 2) The detainee stated one reason he had continued with bin Laden for so long was because Usama bin Laden knew and trusted him.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated he knows nothing about the Farouq Camp.
  - b) The detainee stated he knows nothing relating him to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
  - c) The detainee stated he has never loaded anything onto a ship or supervised the loading of anything onto a ship in Port Sudan, Sudan.

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QOSI, IBRAHIM AHMED MAHMOUD**

d) The detainee denied ever being a part of al Qaida.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

17 January 2008

To: AL QAHTANI, MAAD

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, MAAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he and another individual whom the detainee had met at a mosque discussed jihad. The detainee and the other individual decided to travel together to Afghanistan for jihad.
    - 2) The detainee stated he received assistance from an individual who was known to facilitate the travel of prospective jihadists to Afghanistan.
    - 3) The detainee stated he paid for his travel with his own money. Around this time the detainee stated he underwent Itizam and became a true believer in jihad.
    - 4) The detainee stated his trip to Afghanistan was for the purpose of participating in jihad, which he deemed a religious obligation.
    - 5) The detained stated he swore bayat to bin Laden in person while at bin Laden's residence in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that after he pledged bayat, he was approached and asked to conduct a martyr mission for bin Laden. The detainee stated that per his bayat, he was obliged to conduct a martyr mission.

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### **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, MAAD**

- 6) The detainee stated he visited Usama bin Laden at his house in order to honor and praise him. The detainee told Usama bin Laden that he would continue to serve bin Laden, just as the detainee would continue serving the prophet Mohammed. Bin Laden instructed the detainee to contact a senior al Qaida operative to make arrangements for the detainee to complete a mission in the United States.
  - 7) The detainee was one of eight operatives selected by Usama bin Laden during 2000-2001 to train and prepare for the 11 September 2001 operation.
  - 8) The detainee was selected by Usama bin Laden or another senior al Qaida leader for the 11 September 2001 operation. The detainee also received money and travel assistance for the operation from a senior al Qaida travel facilitator. The detainee understood the mission would be a suicide operation.
  - 9) The detainee stated that his decision to accept the martyr mission stemmed from three basic fatwas. The first fatwa obligated the detainee to travel to Afghanistan and participate in jihad. The second fatwa obligated the detainee to swear bayat to Usama bin Laden. The third fatwa obligated the detainee, based on his pledge of bayat to bin Laden, to do whatever bin Laden asked of him, to include conducting a martyr mission.
  - 10) The detainee stated that a senior al Qaida operative gave him approximately 5,000 to 6,000 United States Dollars and airline tickets for the operation.
  - 11) The detainee stated his airline ticket to Orlando, Florida was one-way. Once the detainee arrived in Orlando, he was stopped by Customs and denied entry into the United States based on his lack of English skills, no identifiable purpose, and no personal contacts in the country. As a result, the detainee took a return flight to the United Kingdom.
  - 12) The detainee stated he had been on a jihad mission for six to eight months. The detainee also affirmed that he would have completed whatever mission he was assigned in the United States.
  - 13) The detainee stated that on approximately 27 August 2001, he met Usama bin Laden again at bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan after the detainee returned from his failed mission to the United States.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated he attended training at the al Farouq training camp for two months. The detainee said that this training was considered his basic country training and he was taught basic weapons skills and tactics. The detainee stated that after completing this

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, MAAD

initial training he attended a City Tactics course in Kandahar, AF for approximately a month and a half.

- 2) The detainee stated that after al Farouq training camp, he started advanced training at the Tarnak Farms Training Camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan.
- 3) The detainee stated he spent approximately two months at Tarnak Farms Training Camp. The detainee practiced firing automatic rifles and pistols while walking, running, and from moving vehicles. The detainee also practiced urban warfare techniques, such as room clearing, kicking down doors, and jumping through windows. The detainee was also shown how to use explosives to blow open a locked door.
- 4) The Tarnak Farms facility housed an al Qaida poison and explosive training laboratory and an advanced operational training camp. The Tarnak Farms camp was the most important al Qaida training camp in Afghanistan since it was where al Qaida operatives received advanced operational training including urban assault and other tactics.

### c) Connections/Associations

- 1) The detainee stated he met with Usama bin Laden on four occasions.
  - 2) The detainee stated he met with a senior al Qaida operative five times and spoke on the telephone with him twice. The meetings involved instructions regarding the detainee's mission. The senior al Qaida operative arranged for another al Qaida member to train the detainee on how to use the internet and email.
  - 3) The detainee listed the names of individuals he was associated with while in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Included in the list were Usama bin Laden and several senior al Qaida leaders. The detainee identified 21 other individuals who he was associated with while in Kandahar who were detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
  - 4) The detainee stated he met with two senior al Qaida members in a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001.
  - 5) The detainee was identified as a member of a group of thirty Usama bin Laden bodyguards and drivers that fled the city of Khowst, Afghanistan en route to the Pakistan border.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee denied having prior knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee also denied knowledge of any rumors or

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plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.

b) The detainee stated previous interviewers' had coerced him into admitting that he had traveled to the United States to die. The detainee alleged that in return for this admission, these interviewers promised the detainee his freedom.

c) The detainee stated he is a different person now than he was in the summer of 2001. The detainee stated he would not have done a mission that involved killing women and children.

d) The detainee stated he would not kill innocent people and thanks God that he did not participate in the mission. The detainee also stated that if he had been told of this mission in advance, he would have refused to do it. The detainee stated it is against his religion to commit suicide.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantnamo Bay, Cuba**

07 January 2008

To: AL-SHUMRANT, MUHAMMAD ABD AL-RAHMAN

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-SHUMRANT, MUHAMMAD ABD AL-RAHMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he received his strong religious beliefs from his father who taught him about Islam and the duties it required. His radical beliefs were strengthened in 1991, when the United States landed troops in Saudi Arabia. The detainee stated he strongly believes the Americans are his enemy and the enemy to all Muslims.
    - 2) The detainee stated he met a jihadist recruiter at a high school in April 2000. The detainee met with the recruiter again in September 2000 and received instructions on travel to Afghanistan.
    - 3) The detainee stated he got his wish to fight on the front line. The detainee stated he was fighting against Afghanistan forces and not Americans. After a month on the front line, detainee heard of the attacks on the United States.
    - 4) The detainee stated he spent about five months on the front lines. The detainee operated a small multi-channel handheld radio.
    - 5) The detainee stated that while he was at Tora Bora, the bombing started. The detainee stated he was given a Kalashnikov rifle, since the Afghans were coming closer. The detainee stated they killed any Afghan they could.

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### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-SHUMRANT, MUHAMMAD ABD AL-RAHMAN

- 6) The detainee was identified as a major recruiter within Saudi Arabia who recruited youths from a school.
  - 7) The detainee stated he loved Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated Usama bin Laden's one mistake of attacking innocents on 9/11, did not negate the good he had done, or the pious, simple life he led. The detainee stated he would die for Usama bin Laden if the cause were consistent with Islamic teaching.
  - 8) The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to assist brother Muslims and would have fought against anyone on the other side, including Americans.
  - 9) The detainee stated he was prepared to fight Americans and the Northern Alliance. If the Americans had closed in on him, he stated he would have been the first to fight. The detainee explained it was a matter of defending Islam when it came to fighting Americans in Afghanistan, an Islamic country.
  - 10) The detainee stated he believes America is a country full of infidels due to all the sins that they commit daily and also the fact that they are not Muslim. The detainee stated he truly believes Islam is the only religion that should exist.
  - 11) The detainee stated he fought for the Taliban and knows that he is liable for his actions.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated he had one month of military training in the Saudi Arabian Army during the Gulf War. The detainee trained on the G3, 9mm handguns, and grenades.
  - 2) The detainee stated he attended the Khalden Training Camp and received training on the AK 47, RPG, BK, Doska, mortars, SPG-9, Type 75 and four or five other types of artillery.
  - 3) The Khalden training camp provided basic military training in an accelerated version of that given at al Farouq. The entire six-month program at Khalden consisted of the following segments; light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography, and a tactical course.
  - 4) The detainee stated that he wanted to learn about mines, like the ones in Chechnya so he went to al Farouq to get training. At al Farouq he stated he studied mines, explosives, how to insert metal fuses into explosives, how to strip wires and how to use matches to detonate explosives.

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### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL-SHUMRANT, MUHAMMAD ABD AL-RAHMAN

- 5) Al Farouq was an al Qaida run training camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The camp provided a general program that consisted of a fundamental or basic course 40 days long. The course taught relevant military topics. The trainees learned fundamental military skills in light and heavy weaponry, field guns, warheads, topography, and explosives.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee stated he met a senior al Qaida lieutenant in Pakistan and stayed with him for three to five days until he was able to leave and go to Afghanistan.
  - 2) The detainee stated that upon arrival in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee stayed at a guest house in the Haje Habash Village for approximately one week.
  - 3) The detainee stated he stayed at the Haji Habash guest house. The Haji Habash guest house was a transition point for fighters and people receiving training.
  - 4) The Haji Hibash guest house is likely a safe house for al Qaida members. Al Qaida maintained a safe house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, near the Haji Habbesh mosque. The house was referred to as a mudafa, which is the term to define transient houses used for billeting Arabs on their way to train at Camp al Farouq.
  - 5) The detainee's name was noted on a recovered packet of Arabic language documents found in a private residence occupied by Arabs in Northeast Kandahar, Afghanistan. The packet had handwritten Arabic text on its exterior which read "al Farouq Camp, Kabul, Operations Course/Cycle Report".
  - 6) The detainee's name was listed as one of the captured mujahedin on a list in Pakistan.
- d) Intent
- 1) The detainee stated he is not a member of the Taliban or al Qaida, but was fighting strictly to adhere to the Muslim belief of jihad. If released, the detainee would participate in jihad again if Muslims were threatened and would fight Americans if given the opportunity.
  - 2) The detainee stated he never will leave or forget the Taliban and al Qaida and their way of life. The detainee stated he is keeping al Qaida in the front of his mind because it helps him maintain his dislike for the Americans. The detainee stated the more he thinks of and praises Usama bin Laden, the more he understands why he is in Guantanamo and why he should continue to resist the American way of life. The detainee also stated he loves Usama bin Laden and if he ever gets out of Guantanamo he will go back to fight the

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Americans and kill as many as he can.

**e) Other Relevant Data**

- 1) The detainee, along with 83 other mujahedin fighters, was captured in a mosque by Pakistani government forces on 14 December 2001.
  - 2) The detainee stated he had prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks.
  - 3) A source stated the detainee is viewed as a religious leader in the camp. The detainee gives prayers and speeches which encourage fellow detainees to disobey the instructions of the military police.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks on the United States prior to their execution of 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
  - b) The detainee stated that 11 September 2001 attacks were not true Islam.
  - c) The detainee has not heard of any future attacks on the United States. The detainee does not know anyone who has knowledge, or was involved in past attacks on the United States, to include the American Embassy bombings in Africa and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen.
  - d) The detainee denied having been at the Khalden Camp in 1998. The detainee stated he was taking care of his uncle who was battling cancer.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

09 January 2008

To: QAHTANI, SAID MUHAMMAD HUSYAN

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QAHTANI, SAID MUHAMMAD HUSYAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee joined al Qaida after the detainee pledged bayat to Usama bin Laden.
    - 2) The detainee volunteered to be a suicide bomber who was ready to martyr himself for jihad.
    - 3) The detainee stated he wanted to go to Chechnya to lend relief support or fight on behalf of his Muslim counterparts. The detainee planned to enter Chechnya, whose borders were closed at the time, by joining a relief organization. Once there, the detainee planned to leave the relief organization and join the fighting.
    - 4) The detainee stated that after he was told it would be difficult to enter Chechnya, he traveled to Pakistan instead. The detainee stayed several nights at the Raywan Center in Lahore, Pakistan.
    - 5) The Raiwand Mosque near Lahore, Pakistan was identified as the most important mosque to the Jamat-al-Tabligh, and serves as the organization's headquarters.
    - 6) Jamat-al-Tabligh has reportedly been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of religious activities. The organization is closely aligned

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### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QAHTANI, SAID MUHAMMAD HUSYAN

with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and al Qaida.

- 7) The detainee stated he stayed at the Quba Training Camp in Pakistan for approximately a week waiting for fighting. After the detainee realized there was not fighting there, he traveled to Afghanistan to join the fight.
- 8) The detainee stated he spent several months at the front lines near Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee performed security work behind the lines and was armed with a Kalashnikov rifle that was issued by the line commander.
- 9) The detainee stated he traveled a second time to Afghanistan to fight on behalf of the Taliban.
- 10) The detainee stated he traveled to the front line near Karabagh, Afghanistan and was issued a Kalashnikov rifle and ammunition.
- 11) The detainee stated that after his group retreated to Pakistan, they were helped by villagers who demanded the group surrender their weapons. The detainee surrendered his Kalashnikov rifle, but kept a hand grenade. The group eventually reached the Tora Bora mountains in Afghanistan.
- 12) The detainee stated that in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, he was issued a Kalashnikov rifle and was assigned to a trench near a SAM 7 Missile site.

#### b) Training

- 1) The detainee stated that at Quba Camp, he received training in physical exercise, weapons, land navigation, celestial navigation, and religion. The weapons training included instruction on Kalashnikov rifles, PK Machine Guns, hand grenades, and RPGs.
- 2) The detainee was reported to have trained at al Farouq Camp.
- 3) The al Farouq training camp was reportedly run by al Qaida and provided a general program that consisted of a fundamental or basic course lasting 40 days. This course consisted of a basic review of relevant military topics. A different topic was covered each week, providing the trainee with fundamental military skills in light and heavy weaponry, field guns, warheads, topography, and explosives.
- 4) The detainee stated he attended the Khalden Camp, where he received weapons training on the Kalashnikov rifle, RPK rifle, RPG-7 and Makarov pistol. The detainee received artillery training on the DSHK-38, 38 AGS-17 and ZPU-2. The detainee also received tactics training, which included simulated attacks and instruction on regrouping, patrols,

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hand signals and ambushes.

- 5) The detainee stated he was trained to operate T-54 and T-55 Soviet tanks at a Taliban armory in Khowst, Afghanistan.
  - 6) The detainee stated he visited a training camp in Shakardarah, Afghanistan which was run by an offshoot of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The camp provided specialized training in urban warfare.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee stated he was strongly influenced to fight in Afghanistan after being issued a fatwa by a Saudi Sheikh.
  - 2) The Sheikh reportedly condoned the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States and helped raise money for Usama bin Laden.
  - 3) The detainee stated Camp Quba was affiliated with and run by a group known as Ashkar Taybah.
  - 4) Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) has been identified as a designated foreign terrorist organization. LT is the armed wing of a Pakistan-based Sunni anti-United States missionary organization. The group has claimed or been implicated in a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets that have left dozens of people dead. LT may be facilitating the movement of al Qaida members in Pakistan.
  - 5) The detainee stated he contacted a senior al Qaida lieutenant to receive additional training. The detainee stayed at the al Qaida lieutenant's guest house for approximately one week.
  - 6) The detainee stated that while on the front lines, he was tasked by an Egyptian to distribute money to other fighters.
  - 7) The detainee identified an Egyptian who traveled with four body guards gave the detainee \$500 in US currency.
  - 8) The detainee identified another individual who accompanied the Egyptian to the front lines. That individual was a well known al Qaida operative.
  - 9) The detainee regularly assisted a senior al Qaida military member while on the front lines.

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### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QAHTANI, SAID MUHAMMAD HUSYAN

- 10) The detainee's name was on a list of al Qaida Mujahedin. The list indicates that the detainee's passport, credit card, and discharge identification card were held in an al Qaida account.
  - 11) The detainee stated he knew Said al Ghamdi and Ahmed Alnami, two of the hijackers who were on United Flight 93 during the 11 September 2001 attacks.
  - 12) The detainee stated he knew Ahmed al Ghamdi, another 11 September 2001 hijacker. The detainee had known Ahmed al Ghamdi a long time.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated he did not go to Afghanistan with the intention of joining the Taliban. The detainee's main purpose was to see the accomplishments of the Taliban.
  - b) The detainee stated he was never an al Qaida member and does not know if he ever met or fought with al Qaida forces.
  - c) The detainee stated he did not swear bayat to Usama bin Laden or any terrorist organization.
  - d) The detainee stated he would never be involved with an organization or militia whose purpose was to commit terrorist acts. The detainee also stated he would not involve himself with a group that would act as the aggressor in a military campaign.
  - e) The detainee denied having prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or its interests.
  - f) The detainee stated that if released, he would like to return home to see his family and complete his studies. The detainee stated he would not return to Afghanistan, Pakistan, or any other country for the purpose of taking up arms against the United States or its allies.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 November 2007

TO: NASSER, ABDULATIF

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSER, ABDULATIF

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated when he was young he learned about the Russian invasion of Afghanistan from television and newspapers, and it was at this time he knew he wanted to fight.
    - 2) The detainee stated he worked into a lower leadership position in his neighborhood Jamaat al Adl Wa al Ihssan chapter in Morocco. In the summer of 1990, the detainee was put on house arrest after the leader of Jamaat al Adl Wa al Ihssan and the detainee attended a peaceful sit-in in protest.
    - 3) The detainee stated Jamaat al Adl Wa al Ihssan is an Islamic fundamentalist group.
    - 4) The detainee stated he watched a training video focusing on the glory of fighting jihad, and the reasons why individuals should go to Afghanistan to fight for Islam. The detainee stated the film footage was very moving and reinforced his feelings about going to jihad.
    - 5) The detainee stated he decided to go to the front lines to fight the Northern Alliance.
    - 6) The detainee stated he spent approximately three years with the Taliban forces fighting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. He spent two years fighting on the Northern line,

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASSER, ABDULATIF

the Kabul line and spent almost one year fighting on the Bagram line.

- 7) The detainee stated that he was in charge of artillery while on the line. The detainee stated he taught the men on the front line and the artillery line how to use the weapons and explosives.
  - 8) The detainee stated he was the emir of travel while he was on the front line. The detainee stated after the Northern Alliance broke through the lines protecting Kabul, Afghanistan he was chosen to lead the men from the lines back to Kabul.
  - 9) The detainee stated he was a member of the al Qaida explosives committee, was an explosives trainer in Afghanistan, and accompanied Ibn Sheikh al Libi to a meeting with Usama Bin Laden at Tora Bora.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated that at the end of 1997, al Musrati arranged for him and the detainee to travel to Afghanistan to train on military weapons and tactics.
  - 2) The detainee stated he met up with Abdul Hakim Al-Libi, who convinced him to go to a training camp attended by many Libyans. The detainee stated he went to a camp near Derunta, Afghanistan run by a Moroccan named Salah Al-Din. The detainee stayed there two weeks and trained on the PK and Kalashnikov rifle.
  - 3) The detainee stated he trained three months at the al Farouq training camp. The detainee stated he received basic skills training on the Kalashnikov rifle, map reading, camouflage, artillery, and mountain tactics.
  - 4) The detainee stated he received training on the Kalashnikov, 9mm Makarov, AK 47, AKM, 7.62 RPK, 7.62 RBD, AKS, M-16, SKS, SVD, RPD 9mm TT, AKR, UZI, Beka, J-3 RPG, grenades, TNT, C3, C4, 82 mortar, Howitzer (anti-tank), SPG9, Zukiak and Dashka anti-aircraft, and SA-7 and Stinger SAMS, while at al Farouq.
  - 5) At Jihad Wal, an advanced training al Qaida run camp, the detainee stated he received theoretical and practical training regarding guerilla warfare, mountain tactics, topography, maps, using hand-held radios, conducting surprise/ambush attacks on military targets, reconnaissance, and additional training on weapons used in guerilla warfare. The mountain tactics included operating in mountain environments without the use of a GPS.

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- 6) The detainee was identified as one of the main jihadists who attended the explosives and poisons training at the Kandahar Airport Complex and had access to the laboratory.

#### c) Connections/Associations

- 1) The detainee stated he worked in Libya for two years selling goods in various markets, and traded between Libya and Sudan for approximately one and a half years. While at a market in Sudan, the detainee stated he met and was recruited for jihad by Abdul Hakim al Libi.
- 2) The detainee stated Abdul Hakim al Libi was part of a group of fighters from Libya called the Islamic fighting group.
- 3) The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization or are active in the international Mujahedin network.
- 4) The detainee stated that he joined the Jamat-al-Tabiligh group in Sudan for approximately forty days before splitting from his friends and joining the Kulyat al-Koran al-Karim (University of the Sacred Koran) in Madani, Sudan. Having tried dawa (spreading the message) and hijra (migration), the detainee decided that the only other option for serving Islam was to turn to jihad.
- 5) Jamat-al-Tabiligh organization has been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.
- 6) The detainee stated that while in Sudan, he worked as a production overseer in the Usama bin Laden owned company, Sharikat Wadi Alakik. The detainee stated he worked there for approximately two years. During this time, the detainee frequently saw Usama bin Laden running the day-to-day operations of his business.
- 7) The detainee stated that in February, 2001, he attended the wedding of Usama bin Laden's son, in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he stayed at an al Qaida guesthouse in Kandahar that was hosted by the Libyan organization, Al Jama Al Islami Al Mugatila.
- 8) Al Jam'a al-islamiyyah al-Muqatilah is an alias for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

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### d) Other Relevant Data

- 1) The detainee was identified as an al Qaida explosives expert.
- 2) The detainee was identified as a trainer at al Farouq.
- 3) The detainee was identified as one of the trainers at the Ainak training camp for a course on how to take measures against air attacks.
- 4) The Ainak training camp was identified as the al Farouq training camp at a new location. The camp offered basic training, anti-aircraft training and mountain combat tactics courses.
- 5) The detainee was identified as a heavy artillery trainer in Afghanistan, and as one of the radio operators in Tora Bora, Afghanistan during the battle between the Arabs and the Americans.
- 6) The detainee stated he was the highest ranking defender of Tora Bora detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
- 7) The detainee was identified as one of the individuals involved in the destruction of the Buddha statues carved into the mountainsides of Afghanistan.

### 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a) The detainee stated he had the opportunity to swear bayat to Usama bin Laden, but chose against it. The detainee stated he still respected Usama bin Laden but disagreed with what bin Laden and al Qaida were doing outside of Afghanistan. The detainee advised he did not think Usama bin Laden was in a position to issue a fatwa because he was not a religious scholar. The detainee stated this was especially true if the fatwa ordered something that would cause harm to others since this goes against Islamic law.
- b) The detainee denied he ever admitted he was al Qaida, on the al Qaida explosives committee, an explosives trainer, or that he accompanied senior leaders to a meeting with Usama bin Laden.
- c) The detainee stated if he were released he would go to Morocco, see his family and go back to work buying and selling merchandise.
- d) The detainee stated he did not agree with the attack on 11 September 2001 on the United States. The detainee further thought the people killed on 11 September 2001 were innocent and it was wrong to attack them. The detainee further explained it was against Islamic principles to

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attack innocent people and that Usama bin Laden is wrong to justify attacking Americans because they are "unbelievers", when Islamic law teaches Christians and Jews are not unbelievers. The detainee also stated it is wrong to attack people simply because they are unbelievers and that Muslim and Christians are the same.

e) The detainee stated he did not receive chemical or biological weapons training.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense

Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

08 November 2007

To: JABAR, JOWAD

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW  
BOARD IN THE CASE OF JABAR, JOWAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee stated that in 1997 he broke into a box car, which was considered a serious offense by the Iraqi government. The detainee stated he felt he had to flee to Iran. The detainee stayed in Iran for fourteen months. The detainee stated life in Iran became difficult and he was afraid of being discovered. The detainee stated he met an Iraqi smuggler who acted as a guide and took the detainee and his family to a town near the border of Quetta, Pakistan. The detainee stated he contacted the United Nations for the purpose of requesting political asylum there but he did not complete the paperwork. Over a period of three months he and his family lived in Karachi, Quetta and Islamabad, Pakistan.
    2. The detainee stated that in 1998 he went from Islamabad to Peshawar, Pakistan then to Afghanistan. The detainee stated he did not tell the Taliban he was a Shiite. The detainee stated the Taliban let him move into a house, by coincidence, with another Shiite family near Kabul, Afghanistan.
    3. A source stated the detainee told the source that the detainee worked with the Taliban and operated as a conduit between the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan and the former president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein. The detainee told the source that the detainee traveled via a secret vehicular route between Iraq and Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan. The detainee talked about one specific trip that he made to get supplies from Iraq. Upon return, the

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detainee distributed the supplies to members of the Taliban.

4. A source stated the detainee talked about one specific trip that he made to get supplies from Iraq. Upon return, the detainee distributed the supplies to members of the Taliban. In return the Taliban gave the detainee two black Toyota military specific vehicles.
5. A source stated the detainee decided to create a fighting unit comprised predominantly of Iraqis and ethnic Arabs from within Afghanistan. The detainee intended to sell the unit's services to the highest bidding warlord. The detainee would promise them food, clothing, housing, transportation and documentation if they would join his unit. If they refused, the detainee turned them over to the Taliban as a spy and subsequent imprisonment and torture.
6. A source stated the detainee attempted to recruit individuals into the detainee's fighting unit. A couple of these individuals went to Uzbekistan where they were captured and returned to Afghanistan. The source stated the Taliban put the individuals in jail in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, where they were interrogated by the detainee.
7. A source stated he went to the detainee's residence, which was owned by the Taliban police. The source stated the detainee asked the source to join a group of fighters the detainee had recruited but the source declined. The source stated that the detainee later took the detainee's group of fighters to the front lines to fight against the Northern Alliance.
8. A source stated the detainee was an interrogator with the Taliban Security. The source also stated the detainee was affiliated with the non-government organization, al Wafa. The source also stated the detainee said al Wafa gave money to the Taliban.
9. Another source stated that the detainee was an interrogator for the Taliban and had a relationship with the al Wafa organization. The source stated the detainee had a cell phone, which in Afghanistan a person must have permission from the Minister of Defense and the Taliban to have a cell phone.
10. Al Wafa is identified in Executive Order 13224. Executive Order 13224 was created to block property and prohibit transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.
11. A source stated that the detainee was the Director of Intelligence for the Taliban at Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.
12. A source stated that the detainee was the Chief of the Taliban's interrogation office at Mazar, Afghanistan. The detainee was responsible for overseeing and conducting

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interrogations. The detainee had approximately 10 to 15 interrogators working for him. Afghans that were interrogated were mostly just questioned, sometimes beaten. Uzbeks were often beaten or tortured. Shiites were almost always tortured.

13. A source stated the detainee told the source that he worked as a recruiter for the Taliban and as an interrogator for the Taliban police in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan.

### **b. Training**

1. A source stated the detainee was a low ranking member of the Iraqi Interior Ministry Police from approximately 1982 to 1986. In 1986, the detainee transferred to the Fourth Corps of the Iraqi Army and fought in the war against Iran.
2. The detainee stated that in 1985 he joined the Iraqi Military's 702nd brigade, a light infantry brigade, which relied mainly on the Kalashnikov rifle and the Russian PK machine gun.
3. The detainee admits to knowing how to interrogate in Arabic.

### **c. Connections/Associations**

1. A source stated that while in Iraq, the detainee was a member of the Amin Emergency Response Group. This group was responsible for tracking down people opposed to Saddam Hussein and torturing and/or killing them.
2. A source said that a few months prior to 11 September 2001 the detainee sent an associate to Usama bin Laden's house in Kandahar, Afghanistan for money. At the meeting with Usama bin Laden, the associate received 11,000 United States Dollars. The detainee used this money to dig wells in the Mazar, Afghanistan. The associate also received 100,000 American dollars from al Wafa for the detainee to build a bridge, repair roads and buy a car.
3. The detainee stated that the Governor of Mazar-e-Sharif, provided him with a permit to get his telephone turned on. The detainee explained that satellite telephone service required a permit and a setup fee of 300 United States Dollars. The detainee said he asked and received assistance from the Taliban because he had to feed his family.
4. A source stated that after the US bombing commenced, the detainee moved to Khoshilabad, Afghanistan and lived under the protection of the two commanders of Khoshilabad, Afghanistan. The detainee hid in Khoshilabad, Afghanistan until he was captured by the US.

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5. A source stated that the detainee was in Afghanistan for four years and that the detainee met with a senior al Qaida member to obtain money.
6. The detainee stated he met a Mullah in Kabul who was a Taliban leader. The Mullah assisted his family to stay in the house with a Shiite family. He stated that he continued to receive financial assistance from the Taliban and that a commander gave him a piece of land.

### **d. Other Relevant Data**

1. A letter recovered from a former al Qaida training camp, that was addressed to a senior al Qaida official, identified the detainee as a former Iraqi Intelligence Officer that deserted his post and fled to Afghanistan. The letter also identifies the detainee as a member of the al Qaida Security Command assigned as an investigator despite being unable to speak Farsi or Pashtu.
  2. A source stated that the detainee was an important military commander with the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif and because of his prominence, a bodyguard frequently accompanied him.
  3. A source stated a Northern Alliance Commander sent soldiers to capture the detainee. The commander's forces took into possession two vehicles, and the military house that was given to the detainee by the Taliban members who were working with the detainee at the time of the capture.
  4. A source stated the detainee said a senior al Qaida member was in charge of all Arabs in Afghanistan and reported directly to Usama bin Laden, and the next person under this senior al Qaida member in the chain of command was the detainee.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated he was a good friend with an individual who was the leader of a Taliban tribe in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he could not be in charge of anything with the Taliban because he was a foreigner, but instead served as a type of advisor to the individual. The detainee stated there was no real structure to the Taliban and people were in positions based on how intelligent they were.
  - b. The detainee stated he knew nothing about the planned attack on the United States before 11 September 2001.
  - c. The detainee stated that he helped the Northern Alliance against the Taliban.

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- d. The detainee said that he had never used a weapon against the United States or the Northern Alliance.
- e. The detainee said that even though the Taliban provided him with a house and food for himself and his family every day; they did not require him to work for them.
- f. The detainee said that he never worked for the Taliban, but that members of the Taliban provided food and shelter for him and his family.
- g. The detainee later denied sending money through his cousin in Sweden.
- h. The detainee said he assisted a commander in the Northern Alliance, and a member of the Northern Alliance. The detainee also stated he assisted a person who worked for the new Afghanistan state intelligence who was sentenced to death by the Taliban.
- i. The detainee stated that in his opinion the other Iraqi detainees were fabricating stories about the detainee.
- j. The detainee stated that he was not the Director of Intelligence for the Taliban, and other detainees are saying he is because they do not like him.
- k. The detainee stated in order to become a Taliban interrogator a person must be an Afghan citizen, have a degree and then be appointed by the Minister of the Interior. The detainee stated interrogators earned three dollars a month. The detainee knew this because he was friends with all the interrogators.
- l. The detainee stated his charity was one reason he was respected in the village. He provided transportation for the villagers who would only pay what they could afford.
- m. The detainee stated he provided two individuals with money and food back in Afghanistan. The individuals thought the detainee had money because he had a car in his driveway. The detainee stated the car was an older car provided by the company for which he worked.
- n. The detainee stated he never received funds from al Wafa.
- o. The detainee stated the biggest reason he was liked in his village was he successfully negotiated with the Taliban, preventing them from recruiting fighters from each family.
- p. The detainee also stated that a reason for his association with prominent people was he had a satellite phone for rent. This caused people to think he was more important than he actually was so they invited him to be a part of things.

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- q. The detainee stated that he assisted the Northern Alliance by providing transportation to the Northern Alliance Soldiers and housing their top spy. The detainee stated he did this even though this put him and his family in danger and that the Taliban would have put him to death if they found out.
- 5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

02 January 2008

To: AHMED, ABDUL RAHMAN

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, ABDUL RAHMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) In March or April 2001, the detainee attended Masjid al Shohada Mosque, also known as, Mosque of the Martyrs, and the Al Khair Mosque, both in Yemen. The detainee stated Saudi religious leaders issued fatwas calling for jihad and an Egyptian imam speaking outside the Mosque of the Martyrs said jihad was a good, fun thing to do and a duty of all Muslims. The detainee wanted to join the fight against Russians in Chechnya.
    - 2) The detainee stated he purchased a Chechnya jihad recruitment video and watched it before going to Afghanistan.
    - 3) After being inspired by the heroic stories about the fighters in Chechnya, the detainee stated he consulted an individual who had been an Afghan fighter. The individual suggested the detainee go to Afghanistan for training and obtained a Pakistani visa for the detainee. The detainee chose to travel at his own expense.
    - 4) The detainee stated he intended to travel to Afghanistan and then go fight in Chechnya. The detainee stated he departed Yemen with his Yemeni passport and 1,000 United States dollars, traveling with an individual from the Mosque of the Martyrs. The detainee's travel route was by plane from Sanaa, Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi,

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, ABDUL RAHMAN

Pakistan and by bus to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

- 5) After arrival in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the detainee stated he stayed at the al Nibras guest house for one week, during which time Usama bin Laden and two senior al Qaida associates visited the house.
  - 6) The detainee was identified as having traveled to the front lines in Afghanistan, including Konduz, Afghanistan. The detainee was identified as having two training video cassettes that the detainee made about mines and minefields. The detainee was also identified as having a bag full of various currencies and passports from several countries.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated he traveled by bus from Kandahar, Afghanistan to the al Farouq Training Camp and trained for 57 days.
  - 2) The detainee stated he was trained on AK-47, pistols, M16's, Uzi's, G-3's, Kalaco rifles, rocket propelled grenades and land mine theory.
  - 3) The detainee stated he heard the following training courses were available at al Farouq training camp and other training camps: intelligence collection, mountain warfare, artillery, topography, land navigation, anti-aircraft such as Stinger missiles and SA-7s, military leadership, urban warfare, building and planting explosive devices, forgery and poisons.
  - 4) Because the detainee did well at al Farouq Training Camp, the detainee stated he and seven other students were picked from the group of fighters and given special treatment. The detainee's special group was taken to see the fighting at the front lines, and given the opportunity to sit with al Qaida leaders. The detainee stated although he was not the leader of any group, the al Qaida leaders did respect him.
  - 5) The detainee stated all nineteen 11 September 2001 hijackers trained at al Farouq Training Camp.
  - 6) The detainee was identified as being the emir of his group of trainees at al Farouq Training Camp.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee stated he attended a meeting prior to 11 September 2001 in which an upcoming operation was discussed. Al Qaida decided if America did not respond by invading Afghanistan after the attack, al Qaida would launch another operation until

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America did respond.

- 2) The detainee stated he sat with Usama bin Laden more than ten times. The detainee stated he had information regarding future attacks against the United States and United States interests in Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar and Oman.
  - 3) The detainee stated al Qaida's plan was to restart in Yemen after the Taliban government was overthrown by the Americans. The detainee stated his group was to go to Yemen to set up the base and they would be the base of the base, or the Qaida of the al Qaida.
  - 4) The detainee's name appeared on a list of al Qaida Mujahedin accounts seized during a raid of an al Qaida safe house in Rawalpindi, Pakistan.
  - 5) The detainee's name appeared on a computer floppy disk seized during a raid of an alleged al Qaida residence in Karachi, Pakistan
  - 6) The detainee's name appeared on a list of killed or wounded martyrs found on the hard drive of a laptop computer seized during raids in Pakistan.
  - 7) The detainee stated he knew that Usama bin Laden was preparing a big strike on the United States and several smaller attacks.
- d) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee stated he was captured by General Dostum's Forces in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan, and was carrying about 24,000 Pakistani Rupees and 500 United States dollars.
  - 2) After his capture, the detainee stated he was imprisoned in Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan for 52 days and was present during the failed prison uprising.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated he believes Usama bin Laden is a heretic who goes against the teachings of the Koran. The detainee stated he does not agree with al Qaida because they target the innocent, which the Koran forbids.
  - b) The detainee stated he was against the 11 September 2001 attacks and did not consider them jihad. The detainee believes jihad is man fighting man, not man fighting innocents. The detainee stated he has no issues with America.

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- c) The detainee denied possessing any knowledge regarding the World Trade Center attacks, the bombing of the USS COLE, the embassy bombings or any other terrorist attacks.
  - d) While at al Farouq, the detainee stated he was against some of the policies of al Qaida, including suicide missions and killing innocent people. After the detainee voiced his objections, he was suspended from training for two days and told to keep silent on the issue if he wished to continue training.
  - e) The detainee stated he did not go to train to fight United States Forces. Instead the detainee went to fulfill his religious duty to protect himself and his honor. He did not consider his training to be offensive in nature.
  - f) The detainee stated he was not a part of al Qaida or the Taliban.
  - g) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
  - h) After training at al Farouq, the detainee spent three months at an Arab house in Kabul, Afghanistan, waiting for others to travel to Chechnya with. The detainee stated he refused to stay in Afghanistan to fight with the Taliban.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

19 December 2007

To: ZUMIRI, HASAN

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZUMIRI, HASAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he traveled from France to Canada in October 1994 using a false passport. The detainee claimed political asylum because Canada accepted anyone who entered the country. The detainee got married in late 1997 and applied for residency based on his wife's Canadian citizenship. The detainee lived in various parts of Canada working as a general laborer and collecting welfare from the Canadian government.
    - 2) The detainee stated that he traveled between 15 and 25 June 2001 from Montreal, Canada to Afghanistan using a stolen passport. The detainee had an individual modify a passport he stole from a friend.
    - 3) The detainee stated he and his wife desired to move to Afghanistan. They stayed at a hotel in Karachi, Pakistan, using the Jamal as his alias. They moved to Quetta, Pakistan, stayed at an unnamed guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and then stayed at a house for two to three months in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee and his wife moved to Jalalabad, Afghanistan on September 15, 2001, and stayed there for one to two months.
    - 4) The detainee stated that when the opposition forces arrived in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, he went to Toran Camp while his wife moved to Pakistan. While in Toran Camp, the detainee received training in small firearms. The detainee stated he learned how to use these firearms just for fun.

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZUMIRI, HASAN

- 5) The detainee was identified as having given a video recorder to an individual in order to obtain a reconnaissance video of the target and as a prop when the attack is executed. The detainee stole the video recorder in October 1999. The detainee gave an individual 3,500 Canadian Dollars to support the attack in the United States. The detainee knew that the individuals were manufacturing explosives and wanted to be part of the operation.
  - 6) The detainee and others were identified as having participated in planning an armed robbery at the Bureau of Exchange in Montreal, Canada, in September or October 1999. The detainee also robbed tourists and stole computers to make money.
  - 7) The detainee was identified as having intentions to return to Algeria to join the Jama'ah. The detainee was advised to travel to Afghanistan to receive training prior to returning to Algeria.
  - 8) The detainee stated he had been arrested for drugs, stealing, burglary, and not having the proper immigration documents in Spain, Italy, France and Canada.
  - 9) The detainee stated he was a user and a dealer of heroin while he was in Paris, France. The detainee bought and sold heroin after he cut it with other substances to lessen its potency.
  - 10) The detainee stated he engaged in illegal activities while in Canada. The detainee attempted to buy a Canadian passport and he worked in Canada without a valid work authorization. The detainee stole clothes from stores and robbed tourists of their purses and camcorders. On one occasion, the detainee was arrested for attempting to steal a computer from a tourist.
  - 11) The detainee stated he engaged in shoplifting and theft either by himself or with others.
  - 12) The detainee was arrested at Niagara Falls in the summer of 1998. The detainee was in jail for eight days until his wife paid a 2,000 Canadian Dollar bond for his release.
  - 13) The detainee attended six mosques while living in Montreal, Canada, including the al-Sunnah Mosque, a mosque frequented by extremists where members viewed videos of jihad in Algeria.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee attended basic military training in 1988, and served in the Algerian Army from 1988 to 1990. The detainee was assigned to 6th Group Construction and Civil

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZUMIRI, HASAN

Engineering Unit as an assistant to the supply sergeant.

c) Connections/Associations

- 1) The detainee acknowledged that he knows very well the individual who planned to attack the Los Angeles International Airport.
- 2) The detainee is a friend of suspected extremist, and to another who was connected with Armed Islamic Group.

d) Other Relevant Data

- 1) The detainee stated his wife came from a wealthy family, was not employed, and that she converted from Christianity to Islam.
- 2) The detainee was captured in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance forces in December 2001.
- 3) The detainee stated that all the Arabs in his group were armed and that his pistol was for protection only. The United States dropped bombs at the Tora Bora camp and killed majority of the detainee's company, while the detainee suffered injury on his right arm.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a) The detainee stated he never had any involvement with jihad and that he never discussed jihad with anyone.
- b) The detainee stated he immigrated to Afghanistan with his wife because they desired to live in an Islamic country. The detainee received money from his father-in-law and used the money to travel from to Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- c) The detainee stated he simply wanted to immigrate, live and retire peacefully in Afghanistan. The detainee had no intention of ever returning to Algeria.
- d) The detainee stated that his knowledge of the individual who planned to attack the Los Angeles International Airport was merely a coincidence. They both played soccer together and frequented coffee shops and dance clubs.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

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continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 January 2008

To: AL SAWAH, TARIQ MAHMOUD AHMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SAWAH, TARIQ MAHMOUD AHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) 1974. The detainee stated he was recruited into the Muslim Brotherhood while attending a university in Alexandria, Egypt. The detainee sympathized with the cause and joined because he believed Muslims in Egypt were being oppressed.
    - 2) The Muslim Brotherhood originated in Egypt and believes all the problems in the Islamic world stem from the abandonment of Islamic principles and that Islam has the answers for all economic, social, and political problems.
    - 3) 1978. The detainee stated he traveled on a month long visa to France and after six months traveled from France to Holland illegally. Two months later the detainee was arrested and was deported to Egypt for being in Holland illegally.
    - 4) 1981. The detainee stated he was arrested and imprisoned in the Tora Prison in Cairo, Egypt, due to his affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. This arrest came after the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.
    - 5) 1990 to 1992. The detainee stated he lived in Greece and worked as a carpenter. While there, the detainee chose to go to the Balkan region after watching videos depicting the atrocities committed by Serbs against Bosnians.

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- 6) Early 1992 to 2000. The detainee stated he lived in Bosnia and Croatia where he worked as a relief worker for World Islamic Relief Organization. The detainee also worked as an accountant, a religious and Arabic language teacher, and a supervisor for the construction of mosques throughout Bosnia. The detainee obtained Bosnian citizenship by marrying a Bosnian woman.
- 7) The International Islamic Relief Organization, also known as the World Islamic Relief Organization, is the largest Islamic charity organization in Saudi Arabia. International investigations have disclosed the organization has connections to terrorist financing activities and its field offices throughout the world have supported terrorist activity.
- 8) 1993. The detainee stated he was arrested twice while working in Croatia. The first arrest was due to a domestic dispute with his landlord and the second arrest was due to an altercation with a member of an Italian non-governmental organization.
- 9) October 2000 to August of 2001. The Dayton Accords were signed which called for the expulsion of foreign Mujahedin from Bosnia. The detainee stated he was expelled from Bosnia even though he had been granted Bosnian citizenship in 1996. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan where he worked as an explosives trainer at the Abu Obeida camp, also known as Tarnak Farm.
- 10) The Tarnak Farms facility in Afghanistan housed an al Qaida poison and explosive training laboratory and an advanced operational training camp. The Tarnak Farms camp was considered the most important al Qaida training camp in Afghanistan since it was where al Qaida operatives received advanced operational training including urban assault and other tactics.
- 11) End of 2000. The detainee stated he traveled to Turkey, Iran, and eventually to Afghanistan. At this point, Taliban authorities confiscated the detainee's passport and he was interrogated for forty days.
- 12) November 2000. The detainee stated he stayed at the Abu Zubair guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, for a week and a half.
- 13) The Haji Habash guest house was also known as the al Ansar guest house, the Abu Khulud guest house, the Zubair guest house, and the Suhaib guest house. Haji Habash is the name of the district of Kandahar where the guest house was located; the name Haji Habash is derived from the Haji Habash Mosque in Kandahar.
- 14) March 2001 and May 2001. The detainee stated he went to the Kabul, Afghanistan and Bagram, Afghanistan fronts two times to apply his skills as a fighter.

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### **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SAWAH, TARIQ MAHMOUD AHMED**

- 15) Summer 2001. The detainee stated the director of Tarnak Farm instructed the detainee to design a new way to use explosives. The detainee developed a shoe bomb prototype that could be used to bring down an airliner in flight.
- 16) August to November 2001. The detainee stated he rented a house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where he remained until the fall of Jalalabad.
- 17) The detainee admitted being an al Qaida member for approximately two years while serving as an advanced explosives trainer at the Tarnak Farm training camp in Afghanistan.
- 18) The detainee's name was found on an undated computer diskette containing a list of al Qaida members. The diskette was recovered from the home of an al Qaida chief military commander in Afghanistan in December of 2001.
- 19) The detainee's passport was found in the possession of a senior al Qaida lieutenant.

#### **b) Training**

- 1) 1993 to 1996. The detainee stated he joined the Bosnian Third Army, whose members were predominantly Arab Mujahedin fighters. The detainee was trained to use rifles, handguns, rocket propelled grenades, and basic explosives such as grenades and mines. In addition the detainee did freelance work in the disarming of anti personnel mines.
- 2) Mid to Late November 2000. The detainee stated he went to the al Farouq training camp north of Kandahar and received instruction on physical conditioning, urban warfare tactics, weapons training, mountain tactics and mortars.
- 3) The training camp al Farouq is located in Kandahar, Afghanistan and was visited by Usama bin Laden after 11 September 2001 to celebrate the terrorist attacks on the United States.
- 4) April 2001 and May 2001. The detainee stated he went to al Farouq two additional times and received instruction on mortars and an advanced course on improvised explosive devices.
- 5) Mid June 2001. The detainee stated he traveled to a guest house located on Karti Barwan Street, in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee took a three day course on the manufacture of explosives timers made out of Casio watches. The detainee worked on the design of a remote detonator used on limpet mines.

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- 6) July to August of 2001. The detainee stated he was offered a position as an instructor at Tarnak Farm.
  - 7) The detainee stated he taught explosives at Tarnak Farm. The detainee stated his primary training included TNT, bomb making and rocket propelled grenades.
  - 8) The detainee stated he received two months training at the al Farouq Training Camp before moving to Tarnak Farms Training Camp to train others on explosives. The detainee trained at least 40 students to use explosive devices to attack United States forces and civilian targets. Usama bin Laden's chain of command determined who attended training and which topics the detainee would teach. The detainee stated Usama bin Laden praised him personally for the good work he was doing training jihadists.
  - 9) The detainee stated he compiled information about how to make and use explosives from various military books, and used these sources, as well as training he received, to teach his class. The detainee stated the subjects included chemical composition of explosives and electrical circuits. The detainee stated he had been asked to show how to blow up bridges and buildings. The detainee stated he would train the students, then Usama bin Laden would take them away.
  - 10) The detainee stated he was given a compact disc about chemical weapons which he watched and studied.
  - 11) The detainee received a computer disk containing information on chemical weapons from a Bosnian friend.
  - 12) The detainee was identified as the explosives training instructor at the Tarnak camp. The detainee was identified as having been exceptionally knowledgeable at fabricating and teaching explosives.
  - 13) The detainee provided a list of items that could be used to construct remote explosive detonators.
  - 14) The detainee stated he acquired most of his knowledge about explosives from books that were readily available in guest houses throughout Afghanistan. The detainee stated his curiosity about explosives ultimately resulted in his being recognized as an explosives expert.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) 1995 and 1999. The detainee stated a senior al Qaida operative supplied money and arms to the detainee's Mujahedin unit in Bosnia. The detainee saw this senior al Qaida

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operative in Bosnia recruiting Mujahedin to train and help train other Mujahedin in Afghanistan.

- 2) Detainee stated most of the instructors in Afghanistan were predominately from Arab countries. Detainee identified several explosive trainers.
  - 3) The detainee stated he met Ayman al Zawahiri a senior al Qaida lieutenant privately in a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan in 2002.
  - 4) The detainee stated he attended a banquet dinner with Usama bin Laden and a senior al Qaida lieutenant.
- d) Intent
- 1) The detainee wanted to join al Qaida to fight against the United States and the Northern Alliance because he believed America supports the killing of Muslims in Palestine and the murder of women and children in Iraq caused by the United States led embargo.
  - 2) The detainee stated the United States is one of the most violent nations in the world and he does not side with United States policy in the Middle East and its alliance with the Israeli military against Palestinians.
  - 3) The detainee stated he has denounced Islam and is now an atheist, but still holds strong views on the political agenda and motivations of the Muslim Brotherhood.
- e) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee stated he wanted to leave Afghanistan and return to Bosnia before 11 September 2001 because he heard Usama bin Laden was planning an attack against the United States.
  - 2) 18 November 2001. The detainee stated he joined a group of armed fighters in an attempt to get closer to the Pakistani border. Detainee then met an Afghan who turned him over to the Northern Alliance, which held him in prisons in Jalalabad, Afghanistan and Kabul, Afghanistan before turning him over to United States forces.
  - 3) The detainee stated the armed fighters he joined were presumed to be Taliban and other foreign Mujahedin fighters. The detainee further stated while attempting to flee into Pakistan he was injured by a cluster bomb, receiving wounds to the back of his hands, thighs, and buttocks.

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- 4) The detainee stated he created four limpet mines from the plans he developed. The detainee provided detailed information on the design and capability of these limpet mines. The four mines remain in the laboratory the detainee used when he was an instructor at Tarnak Farms training camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan. This lab has various chemicals and other components used by the detainee to create explosives and various improvised explosive devices. If the detainee needed materials such as wires, C-4, C-3, Russian anti personnel mines, etc. for his bomb making, he would send his assistant to procure them.
  - 5) The detainee described limpet mine placement and detonation techniques.
  - 6) The detainee stated he left his explosive device design notes, including those for the shoe bomb, at the Tarnak Farm Camp.
  - 7) The detainee was instructed to teach construction of the shoe bomb to others. Detainee's design for the shoe bomb technically matches the design of the shoe bomb in a failed terrorist attack.
  - 8) The detainee stated he saw large iron sheets that were being used to replicate the hull of a ship while he was at the Tarnak Farms. Varying types of experimental explosives were being used on these metal sheets to judge effectiveness and lethality. The detainee believed these activities were in preparation for the bombing of the USS COLE.
  - 9) The detainee admitted being a Mujahedin since 1992. He does not consider himself a member of al Qaida, Jama at Islamiya, Egyptian Islamic Jihad or other terrorist groups.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee does not believe in the ideology of Usama bin Laden or his followers and stated there was a clear distinction between the Islamic fighting groups and al Qaida in Afghanistan. The detainee further stated most of the Islamic fighting groups such as the Algerians, Tunisians, Libyans, Moroccans, and some Egyptians, were in Afghanistan training and planned on returning to their respective countries in order to fight against their governments and not the Americans.
  - b) The detainee stated he is the type of person who would defend the rights of any innocent person who is attacked and does not view the United States as an enemy and feels the United States is good in general.
  - c) The detainee stated the actions of Usama bin Laden have given all Muslims a bad reputation.

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d) The detainee stated every Muslim has the right to defend himself and his beliefs and feels the only way violence can be justified is when Muslims are attacked, as in Bosnia and Palestine. The detainee stated he does not believe in martyrdom and feels only ignorant people would kill themselves.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 November 2007

To: MOHMAD, HAJAWALI

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHMAD, HAJAWALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee was a moneyman for Usama bin Laden from 1996 to 1997. The detainee conducted most of his money transactions at three money exchangers with offices in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
    2. In March 2000, the detainee facilitated transfers from Usama bin Laden's accounts to purchase shoulder-launched Surface-to-Air Missiles for al Qaida. The detainee and the detainee's business partner worked with an associate of Usama bin Laden who often purchased weapons for Usama bin Laden's organization.
    3. As of April 2000, the detainee, who was Usama bin Laden's financier, had an office in Peshawar, Pakistan and was facilitating the movement of funds associated with the purchase of weapons by the bin Laden organization.
    4. The detainee received one million United States Dollars to manage in April 2000, from Taliban Supreme Leader Mullah Mohammad Omar.
    5. The detainee had a personal and professional relationship with a high-ranking official of the Taliban, and the detainee was instrumental in raising revenue for the Taliban.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHMAD, HAJAWALI

6. The detainee was arrested by the Pakistan authorities at the detainee's residence on January 26, 2002.

### b. Connections/Associations

1. According to a source, the detainee paid for a high-ranking Taliban official's travel to Dubai, United Arab Emirates for cancer treatment and to Saudi Arabia for a religious festival. The detainee was a frequent visitor at the official's office and the detainee purchased numerous vehicles from Dubai for the Taliban.
2. The detainee was identified as a wealthy Afghan "Sara", meaning moneychanger, who was affiliated with the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin. The detainee was closely affiliated with Taliban and was considered to be very close to Taliban leaders Mullah Mohammad Rabbani and Mullah Mohammad Omar.
3. The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) was founded by Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. In the early 1990's, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar also offered to shelter Usama bin Laden after the latter fled Sudan in 1996. The HIG has long established ties with Usama bin Laden.
4. The preachers of Jamat-al-Tabligh organization have been supporting Islamic terrorist groups in south and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. The group is closely aligned with other Pakistani terrorist organizations and the al Qaida network.
5. The detainee maintained friendship and remained in contact with a head of the Afghan National Bank.

### c. Intent

1. The detainee stated that if released he would like to return to his former trade as a moneylender.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee insists he has not conducted business with the Taliban since 1996, which was about the time the Taliban started fighting with the Northern Alliance.
2. In 1996, the detainee obtained 1.5 million United States dollars from the Director of the Bank of Afghanistan to purchase gold in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

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### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHMAD, HAJAWALI

The detainee stated he lost 500,000 United States Dollars as a result of the exchange rate.

3. The detainee stated that he would sell the gold and the Taliban would receive 75% of the profits and he would take 25%.
4. The detainee admitted he was in business with Taliban and worked with the Taliban because of the money. The detainee stated that his business relationship with Taliban lasted approximately three months.
5. According to a source, the detainee was the most important person of the detainee's business partnership, and he believed that the detainee will still share in the partnership's profits when released from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
6. A source stated that he fought with the detainee and other Afghan Taliban members against the Northern Alliance.

#### 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee adamantly stressed that his relationship with the Taliban was simply business and he never agreed with the manner in which they treated people.
- b. The detainee stated he didn't have close connections with other Taliban officials and did not attempt other business deals with individuals or entities associated with Taliban.
- c. The detainee claims that he had no knowledge of al Qaida prior to his arrest and never heard of Taliban converting cash to gold or other commodities to earn a profit.
- d. The detainee claims to have never conducted any currency exchanges or other financial transactions for Hekmatyar or any known associates of Hekmatyar.
- e. The detainee denied any association with al Qaida and stated that he was a simple businessman.
- f. The detainee stated that he never heard of al Qaida or the Taliban shipping gold out of Pakistan. The detainee stated he never heard of Ariana Airlines flights being used in gold smuggling operations.

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REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MOHMAD, HAJAWALI**

g. The detainee stated he is unaware of anyone that used Jamat-al-Tabligh as a cover for illicit purposes or travel.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

12 December 2007

To: BARRE, MOHAMMED SOLIMAN

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BARRE, MOHAMMED SOLIMAN

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee was identified as being assigned to the artillery, to assist the first line in Afghanistan, in February 1992.
    - 2) The detainee stated he acquired a visa sponsored by Jamat-al-Tabligh.
    - 3) The detainee stated he was sent 10,000 United States Dollars to start up a Dahabshiil field office in Karachi, Pakistan in his home. Dehabshiil is a Somali-based hawala, a money transfer service.
    - 4) The detainee stated he hired an individual to courier money for the detainee's Hawala operation.
    - 5) The detainee was identified as someone who hired an al Qaida courier.
    - 6) The detainee's wife was identified as someone who helped the Pakistani-based Somali al Qaida courier facilitate the movement of the family of an al Qaida operative.
    - 7) The detainee stated that after this courier left he hired a replacement.

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BARRE, MOHAMMED SOLIMAN

- 8) The replacement the detainee hired is tied to al Qaida's east Africa network and was known to provide fraudulent travel documents in support of that network.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated he was conscripted into public service after finishing secondary school at approximately 18 or 19 years of age. The detainee was issued a uniform and sent to a refugee camp near Marka, Somalia, where he worked various jobs for approximately six months.
  - 2) The detainee was identified as being in an al Qaida artillery and preps camp in Afghanistan, in January 1992.
  - 3) The detainee was identified as being selected by al Qaida for more advanced training and specialized coursework at the Jihad Wal Camp, courses usually reserved only for sworn al Qaida members.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee's hard drive e-mail in-boxes contained names of several individuals associated with al Ittihad al Islamiya, a terrorist organization affiliated with al Qaida that operates primarily out of Eastern Africa.
  - 2) Al Ittihad al Islami, AIAI, is Somalia's largest militant Islamic organization. Some of its elements associated with the AIAI maintain ties to al Qaida. The AIAI conducted terrorist attacks against Ethiopian forces and other Somali factions in the 1990s.
  - 3) The detainee was identified as a facilitator and financier for al-Wafa in Afghanistan. The detainee was in charge of getting supplies, such as radios, computers, satellite phones and hospital supplies, from Pakistan into Afghanistan for use by the Taliban.
  - 4) The detainee attended an institute, operated by a senior al Qaida member in Kandahar, Afghanistan that used to be associated with religious and language studies and was near a Mujahedin guest house.
- d) Other Relevant Data
- 1) Numerous computer graphics files were found on the detainee's computer that depicted Islamic extremists, resistance fighters or Mujahedin fighting in Afghanistan, combat scenes from Afghanistan, the damaged World Trade Center, Usama bin Laden and terrorist organizations.

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- 2) According to the detainee in November 2001, Pakistani government officials arrested the detainee for illegal money transfers.
- 3) The detainee stated that at the time of his arrest, he had approximately 200-300 customers from his Dababshil business and could receive up to 900 United States Dollars per month in commissions.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a) The detainee stated he was never involved in an armed conflict in Somalia.
  - b) The detainee stated the only time he has ever been to Afghanistan was when he was taken there after being captured in 2002. The detainee denied ever being a fighter in Mujahedin against the Soviets or otherwise.
  - c) The detainee stated he was never involved in an Islamic Militant group or knowingly transferred funds for their cause.
  - d) The detainee stated if he ever transferred money for a bad person it was unknowingly.
  - e) The detainee stated he had never heard of the al Wafa organization prior to his arrest by Pakistani police.
  - f) The detainee stated he lied to obtain his three month Pakistani visa by claiming he was going to Pakistan because he was invited by Jamat-al-Tabligh. The detainee did not join Jamat-al-Tabligh and had no intentions of joining it.
  - g) The detainee stated that when he was in Islamabad, Pakistan, he registered his true name with the United Nations organization, UNCR, as a refugee. The detainee stated his passport was lost or stolen in Rawalpindi, Pakistan in February or March 1994. The detainee stated he did not turn his passport in to any guest house or to any person. The detainee stated he reported his passport lost or stolen with the Rawalpindi, Pakistan police at a station called Central Police.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 December 2007

To: SAID, ZOHAI MOHAMMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, ZOHAI MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee was recruited by his Yemeni friend who persuaded him to go to Afghanistan in 1999 in order to train at a Libyan camp near Kabul, Afghanistan.
    - 2) The detainee's recruiter facilitated the detainee's trip to Afghanistan, including making travel and lodging arrangements for the detainee to stay at guest houses in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
    - 3) The detainee's recruiter was a mid to senior level al Qaida military operative that was killed in the 11 September 2002 raid and fire fight.
    - 4) The detainee stated he traveled from Sanaa, Yemen, to Karachi, Pakistan, where the detainee was met by his recruiter. From Karachi the detainee traveled to Quetta, Pakistan, and from there to Kabul, Afghanistan.
    - 5) The detainee stated that while at the guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan, he made long trips to visit other Yemeni who were at an Arab guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and also visited friends at the battlefield.
    - 6) The detainee stated he arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan and stayed at a guest house located in the Karti Barwan section of the city. After about two weeks the detainee went to the

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, ZOHAIK MOHAMMED

front line. The detainee stated in March 2000, he went back and forth from the front line to the guest house.

- 7) The detainee was one of seven individuals who were selected as martyrs for the Southeast Asia operation. A few months before 11 September 2001, the detainee and the other selected martyrs went to Karachi, Pakistan to train for the hijacking operation. Usama bin Laden picked the American targets for this operation.
- 8) In February 2001, the detainee stated he attended a speech by Usama bin Laden at a center for Arabs near Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 9) The detainee stated he was on the frontlines on 11 September 2001. Following the attacks on 11 September, the detainee stated they spent about 20 to 30 days fortifying the front lines, and he remained on the frontline until Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance.

### b) Training

- 1) The detainee received training on pistols and Kalashnikovs at a Libyan camp located ten kilometers from Kabul, Afghanistan.
- 2) The detainee stated the training camp had ten to fifteen trainees at any given time and lasted forty days. The detainee received training on physical fitness, self defense, small weapons, geography and topography.
- 3) The detainee along with eight or nine other bodyguards attended a special commando course at the Mes Aynak training camp in 1999. The Mes Aynak training camp offered the full range of training, including basic and more advanced training.
- 4) The detainee and a 11 September 2001 hijacker traveled in December 1999 from Afghanistan to Karachi, Pakistan to receive English language training, as well as training to read airline timetables and how to function in Western cities.

### c) Connections/Associations

- 1) The detainee stated he went to the front lines about four times.
- 2) The detainee stated he was sent to the front lines near Kandahar, Afghanistan to fight under the command of a Yemeni associate.
- 3) The detainee stated he met a senior al Qaida operative and former bodyguard for Usama bin Laden at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that the senior al Qaida operative s asked the detainee to travel with him going to Malaysia. The detainee

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knew the senior al Qaida operative for a year prior to traveling with him to Malaysia.

- 4) The individual above that picked up the detainee and senior al Qaida operative has been identified as the main contact and point man for al Qaida in Southeast Asia.
  - 5) The detainee confessed traveling with a senior al Qaida operative to Malaysia and meeting two other individuals.
  - 6) The two individuals mentioned above were members of the group that hijacked American Airlines flight 77 and crashed it into the Pentagon.
  - 7) The detainee stated a senior al Qaida operative gave the detainee money while they were in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Malaysia.
  - 8) The detainee was seen in the company of Usama bin Laden and a senior al Qaida operative. The detainee is believed to be al Qaida due to his access to Usama bin Laden.
  - 9) The detainee's false passport photo and flight coupon from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan were recovered during the arrest of a known Usama bin Laden bodyguard. The detainee's documents were found with photos and documents of other Usama bin Laden bodyguards.
  - 10) The detainee was identified as a Usama bin Laden bodyguard.
- d) Intent
- 1) The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to die as a martyr for God.
  - 2) The detainee swore bayat to Usama bin Laden.
- e) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee stated he lived in a guest house located in the Karti Barwan neighborhood of Kabul, Afghanistan for fifteen months. The detainee later lived at a new guest house directly across the street for eight months.
  - 2) The detainee was in a group of approximately fifty Arabs fleeing from Kabul, Afghanistan to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  - 3) The detainee was part of a group that fled Kabul, Afghanistan to Gardiz, Afghanistan. After encountering opposing forces in Gardiz, Afghanistan, the group went from Zormat,

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Afghanistan to Khowst, Afghanistan, where they waited to cross the border to Bannu, Pakistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a) The detainee stated he has never sworn bayat to Usama bin Laden.
- b) The detainee stated that he never used his weapon or killed anyone. The detainee stated he does not know anything about al Qaida and he is not an Al Qaida member. The detainee stated he does not know anyone who is an al Qaida member.
- c) The detainee stated he has never met nor does he know Khalid Sheik Mohammed.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

11 January 2008

To: ALWAI, JAMAL MUHAMMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALWAI, JAMAL MUHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he began work with al Haramayn in 1995 as a student. The detainee was unable to find employment with a petroleum company after graduation, so he accepted a job with al Haramayn in 1997.
    - 2) Al Haramayn has provided logistical support to the Mujahedin fighters in Afghanistan since the early 1980s. According to United States Intelligence officials, al Haramayn supports Islamic extremist elements in 17 countries or regions, and at the same time, provides humanitarian assistance, religious education and medical care.
    - 3) The detainee stated he was employed by the Yemeni Ministry of Petroleum until May 2001, but left to pursue a higher paying job. The detainee stated he contacted a friend at the Organization for Islamic Studies, who arranged for the detainee to travel to Karachi, Pakistan for employment with the al Wafa Islamic Relief Organization.
    - 4) The Terrorist Organization Reference Guide lists al Wafa on the Terrorist Exclusion List. An organization is placed on the Terrorist Exclusion List if the Secretary of State finds that the organization commits or incites to commit, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity; prepares or plans a terrorist activity; gathers information on potential targets for terrorist activity; or provides

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material support to further terrorist activity.

- 5) The detainee stated the al Wafa office in Karachi, Pakistan did not receive donations, it received money through transfers. The detainee stated he opened a bank account under his name that was used to pay for medicine, medical supplies, salaries and other al Wafa missions.
- 6) Another detainee stated although al Wafa claimed to be a humanitarian Islamic charity organization, they actually funneled money and supplies to al Qaida and Taliban, including medical equipment and weapons.

#### b) Connections/Associations

- 1) The detainee stated he spent two weeks in Kandahar, Afghanistan, working for al Wafa, supplying food, clothing and other comfort items to the Afghans. The detainee stated he was then instructed to return to Karachi, Pakistan by the head of al Wafa in Pakistan. The detainee's main duty was to buy medicine for Afghan refugees, using funds provided to him by al Matrafi. The detainee stated that his purchases were supervised by an associate.
- 2) The associate who supervised the detainee's purchases for al Wafa was a person affiliated with a Malaysian microbiologist.
- 3) An associate of the detainee was introduced to a senior al Qaida official, for the purpose of assessing the associate's general knowledge of biology and laboratory skills.
- 4) The detainee's supervisor was identified as holding meetings with Usama bin Laden prior to 11 September 2001 in Kandahar, Afghanistan to discuss disagreements between al Wafa and al Qaida.
- 5) The detainee stated he relied on the local Taliban office for storage space and access to office equipment. Medical supplies the detainee purchased were sent directly from the vendor to the Taliban office for storage. The detainee would then go to the Taliban office and forward the supplies to Afghanistan.
- 6) The detainee stated he stayed at a special Taliban guest house in Karachi, Pakistan. According to the detainee, this guest house was the launch point for Taliban leaving Pakistan and as a reception point for those coming from abroad.
- 7) The detainee stated he received a call from his supervisor stating the Kandahar, Afghanistan al Wafa office was closing for fear of United States air attacks. The detainee stated his supervisor sent him documents and paperwork from the Kandahar office for safekeeping. Several boxes from Kandahar were brought to the detainee, which he stated

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he never opened.

### c) Other Relevant Data

- 1) The detainee stated that all al Haramayn employees worked for him by 1998. The detainee oversaw the finances that were used for payroll, food, medical supplies, Islamic publications, and general aid. The detainee stated he was responsible for five refugee camps, copying books on Islam for distribution and building mosques.
- 2) The detainee stated the boxes delivered to the detainee after the closing of the al Wafa office in Kandahar, Afghanistan, contained notebooks with handwritten notes describing weapons capabilities, explosives, chemical, pharmaceutical lists, and attack scenarios. The detainee stated he had not seen these items before.
- 3) The detainee was identified as informing an associate that al Wafa purchased 40 Land Cruisers for Taliban fighters after 11 September 2001.

### 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a) The former head of the al Wafa office in Kandahar, Afghanistan, stated there is no relation between al Qaida and al Wafa, because they disliked each other due to a disagreement.
- b) The detainee stated that he was unaware of any connections between AL Wafa and AL QAIDA. The detainee added that he would not have been involved with AL Wafa if he had known that.
- c) An associate of the detainee stated the detainee has no connection to al Qaida or the Taliban.
- d) The detainee maintained he had no contact with members of the Taliban government or the al Qaida terrorist organization.
- e) The detainee stated the al Wafa charity in Karachi, Pakistan was strictly a charitable organization.
- f) The detainee denied ever receiving money to purchase anti-chemical masks, or for any other purpose. The detainee further claimed that he only purchased medical equipment, supplies and furniture while working with al Wafa.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available

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unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

27 December 2007

To: ALSUWEDY, ABDUL AZIZ

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ALSUWEDY, ABDUL AZIZ

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee attended a mosque in Yemen where he heard about jihad from a Sheikh. An individual urged the detainee to go to Afghanistan to participate in a jihad against the Russians.
    - 2) The detainee traveled from Damascus, Syria, to Tehran onto Mashaad, and to Tibatt, Iran. From Iran, the detainee traveled to Qandahar, Afghanistan.
    - 3) The detainee stated that upon arrival in Afghanistan, he informed others that he was there to participate in jihad. The detainee was then directed to go to the al Farouq camp for training.
    - 4) The detainee stated that after receiving treatment for a hurt knee while in Kabul, Afghanistan, he hitchhiked to the lines and made his way to the front lines to fight.

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### b) Training

- 1) In 1990 to 1991, the detainee completed basic training and served as a volunteer in the Yemen National Guard.
- 2) The detainee received training with the Rocket Propelled Grenade, Kalashnikov rifle, PK, and a weapon similar to the .50 caliber machine gun. The training took place around 1991 to 1992.
- 3) The detainee attended the explosives course at al Farouq camp, Afghanistan. After graduation, the detainee was chosen as an assistant to teach an explosives course at Tarnak farms.
- 4) The al Farouq training camp provided a general program that consisted of a fundamental or basic course, lasting 40 days. This course consisted of a basic review of relevant military topics. A different topic was covered each week, providing the trainee with fundamental military skills including light and heavy weaponry, field guns, warheads, topography, and explosives.
- 5) The Tarnak Farms facility in Afghanistan housed an al Qaida poison and explosive training laboratory and an advanced operational training camp. No one was allowed to train at Tarnak Farms without first passing through basic training at al Farouq training camp. The Tarnak Farms camp was considered the most important al Qaida training camp in Afghanistan since it was where al Qaida operatives received advanced operational training including urban assault and other tactics.
- 6) The detainee was identified as having received exclusive instruction on chemical explosives.

### c) Other Relevant Data

- 1) The detainee and others were identified as awaiting training while in Afghanistan. The detainee was believed to be traveling to Chechnya for jihad.

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- 2) The detainee was identified in January 2002 at a guest house in Karachi, Pakistan where the detainee was eventually captured.
  - 3) The detainee was in a Karachi, Pakistan guest house before his arrest. During that time, the Yemenis were waiting to travel home to Yemen. All the men had turned their cash, passports and identification over to al Qaida facilitators for safekeeping upon their arrival in Afghanistan.
  - 4) The detainee helped forge a passport to facilitate travel for another individual.
  - 5) The detainee was named as a captured Mujahedin on a list kept by a senior al Qaida operative.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and denied having any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States.
  - b) The detainee denied any knowledge of bomb making or knowledge of explosives instructors. The detainee claimed the entire notion of building a bomb out of homemade materials seemed very strange and foreign to him.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

28 December 2007

To: BATARFI, AYMAN SAEED ABDULLAH

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BATARFI, AYMAN SAEED ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he was easily persuaded by friends in Pakistan to attend training in Afghanistan. During a break from school, the detainee traveled with a small group of friends from Pakistan to Afghanistan for the purpose of fighting against the Soviet occupation forces. They stayed at Khalden camp for two to three weeks and then moved to the area of Khogay, Afghanistan for approximately one month.
    - 2) The Khalden camp was an al Qaida training camp near Kabul, Afghanistan. Instruction included urban guerilla tactics, physical conditioning and endurance.
    - 3) The detainee stated he heard about the Chechnya conflict on the news. When he was in Saudi Arabia in the summer of 2000, the detainee decided to go to Chechnya to assist in a medical capacity. This decision was not prompted by anyone else. The detainee tried to go to Chechnya through Afghanistan but learned that the roads were blocked so he decided to return to Pakistan.
    - 4) While in Kandahar, Afghanistan in June 2000, the detainee stayed at the Hajji Habbash guest house which was managed by an al Qaida operative.

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- 5) The detainee stated he tried to get to Chechnya again in May or June 2001, but was unsuccessful.
  - 6) The detainee stated that in May 2001, the he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan in search of employment. The detainee stayed for five days in the Ghulam Bacha guest house, which was supported by Usama bin Laden. During his stay, the detainee stated he and others viewed a video on the plight of Muslims, terrorist training, footage of the USS COLE attack, and a speech given by Usama bin Laden.
  - 7) The detainee stated that while he was in Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee sought employment with al Wafa. After negotiations, the detainee stated he accepted a position as a medical supply supervisor and traveled to Karachi, Pakistan to coordinate orders and shipment of supplies.
  - 8) Sometime after 11 September 2001, the detainee traveled to Herat, Afghanistan, where he picked up three trucks to be used by al Wafa as ambulances. Al Wafa paid a total of approximately 15,000 United States Dollars for the three trucks.
  - 9) The detainee stated al Wafa used ambulances to transport money.
  - 10) The detainee left Lahore, Pakistan on 10 November 2001 and traveled to Islamabad, Pakistan. During this trip, the detainee met up with a friend who was a Yemeni merchant from Lahore, Pakistan and stayed at that friend's relative's home.
  - 11) The detainee left Jalalabad, Afghanistan during the bombing of the city and escaped to the Tora Bora Mountains in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he traveled among small groups of fleeing individuals and provided medical attention to those who needed help.
  - 12) The detainee stated he was given a walkie-talkie by an unnamed individual. All area of operations had a radio and those in charge carried a personal radio.
  - 13) The detainee stated he carried a gun while at the Tora Bora Mountains.
  - 14) The detainee stated that Usama bin Laden told him that the mountain road out of Jalalabad, Afghanistan into Pakistan could not be used to evacuate because the villages along that road were hostile to Arabs, and that Usama bin Laden would let people know as soon as he found a way out. A radio transmission instructed the Arabs to meet in Samarkhal, Afghanistan so they could be escorted into Pakistan.
- b) Training

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- 1) The detainee stated he trained with the Mujahedin at a training camp in Khogay, Afghanistan for one and a half months during the summer of 1988. The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle, as well as small anti-aircraft weaponry, such as the heavy Grinov.
- 2) The detainee stated that while in Afghanistan, he trained with the Kalashnikov rifle and participated in at least two night-time raids against the Soviet outposts.
- c) Connections/Associations
  - 1) The detainee stated he studied orthopedic surgery under a physician at the Services Hospital in Lahore, Pakistan during his graduate studies from February to November 1997.
  - 2) The detainee stated he followed the physician with whom he studied under to four hospitals and assisted him during surgeries at his private clinic in Lahore, Pakistan.
  - 3) The physician with whom the detainee studied under was known to have provided treatment to al Qaida members, regardless of their ability to pay. The physician treated fugitive al Qaida operatives without advising Pakistani authorities.
  - 4) The detainee stated the physician with whom he studied under provided medical treatment to Usama bin Laden.
  - 5) The physician with whom the detainee studied under had a very close relationship with Usama bin Laden and loved Usama bin Laden like a son.
  - 6) The detainee stated he worked for al Wafa for approximately nine months in 2001.
  - 7) The detainee stated that in May or June 2001, while enroute to Karachi, Pakistan, he stayed overnight in a Quetta, Pakistan Taliban guesthouse. The detainee met another guest who extended an invitation to visit him while in Karachi. The detainee claimed that al Wafa paid the cost of the airline ticket for his flight from Quetta to Karachi.
  - 8) The detainee stated that in August 2001, the detainee procured supplies and equipment that were donated by the al Wafa at the following hospitals: Ministry of Education Hospital and Ministry of Health Hospital in Kabul, Afghanistan, Omar Hospital and Red Crescent Society Hospital in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
  - 9) The detainee stated that in August 2001, the detainee met a microbiologist at Hajji Habbash guest house who wanted to equip a lab and train the Afghans to test blood. The detainee told another al Wafa employee to purchase four to five thousand United States

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Dollars worth of medical equipment for that individual.

- 10) The detainee was identified as being a past participant in Al Qaida's anthrax program and as having ties to al Qaida.
- 11) The detainee had a friend who was an al Qaida member who had overall control over the movement of al Qaida fighters from Afghanistan through Pakistan to Iran.
- 12) The detainee stated that while in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, the detainee worked in a clinic operated by an individual who had contact with the Taliban.
- 13) The detainee stated he saw Usama bin Laden four or five times in Afghanistan. He recalled seeing Usama bin Laden at two guest houses in Afghanistan. The first time was at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan, a week before 11 September 2001, and the second time was in Kandahar, Afghanistan, when bin Laden gave a speech to over 100 people.
- 14) The detainee stated he talked to Usama bin Laden on two separate occasions in Afghanistan. The first time was at a funeral and the second time was in the Tora Bora Mountains. The detainee stated that in November 2001, during the meeting in the Tora Bora Mountains the detainee and Usama bin Laden discussed escape route plans and the need for medical supplies.
- 15) The detainee stated that Ayman Zawahiri, Usama bin Laden's lieutenant, was present at his meeting with Usama bin Laden, but the detainee did not speak with Zawahiri.

#### d) Other Relevant Data

- 1) In approximately July 2001, the detainee traveled to Karachi, Pakistan to purchase medical supplies for the al Wafa organization in Pakistan. A shipment of cyanide, along with the other medical goods purchased, was handled through the Taliban office in Karachi, Pakistan. Upon the detainee's return to Afghanistan, he found out that many of the supplies he purchased were stored in the Taliban's Ministry of Health warehouse and were not being distributed.
- 2) The detainee stated he purchased 0.5 kilograms of cyanide from the New Chemicals Company in Karachi, Pakistan. The cyanide had been requested by a dentist friend based at one of the hospitals in Kabul, Afghanistan. The cyanide was among many items stolen from a warehouse in Kabul and was never recovered.

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- 3) The detainee stated he requested and received permission from the Jalalabad Taliban Intelligence Director to set up medical operations in the Jalalabad University Hospital.
  - 4) The detainee was identified as a medical representative for al Wafa and was considered the subject matter expert for all medical matters. The detainee was based in Kabul, Afghanistan office but routinely visited Pakistan to obtain and ship medical supplies via truck or aircraft to Afghanistan.
  - 5) The detainee was identified as being associated with the commander of Hizb-e-Islami Khalis. That commander gave the detainee protection, medical supplies and instruments.
  - 6) The Hizb-e-Islami Khalis is reported to have ties and investments in support of insurgents and terrorist organizations in Afghanistan.
  - 7) The detainee stated he stayed in the Tora Bora Mountains for 28 to 29 days, until he was severely wounded near the village of Samarkhal, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he was left for dead, and was rescued by a group of Afghans who took him to the Central Jail in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee asked to be turned over to United States forces because he believed that he would receive better treatment in their hands. On 27 January 2002, the detainee was taken to Bagram, Afghanistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee denied having any knowledge of biological agents, or ever having discussed biological agents with anyone.
  - b) The detainee stated he did not attend any training camps in Afghanistan, as he was a doctor not a fighter. While in Tora Bora, Afghanistan, the detainee claimed he told Usama bin Laden he was not a fighter and did not want to stay on the mountain.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

17 January 2008

To: ZOHAIR, AHMED ZEID SALEM

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ZOHAIR, AHMED ZEID SALEM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a) Commitment

- 1) During a visit to Bosnia in 1993, al Qaida gave financial support to a special unit led by the detainee. During the 1992-1993 timeframe the detainee had access to at least 500 blank Bosnia passports which the detainee provided to Mujahedin.
- 2) The humanitarian organization Charitable Community for Orphans was involved in caring for Muslim war orphans. The key individual in the work of this organization was an international terrorist.
- 3) The detainee stated in winter 1995 he traveled to Bosnia and Croatia and stayed for two years. The detainee associated with relief agencies such as Croatian Assistance, a Saudi relief agency funded in part by the al Haramain relief organization. The detainee stated his specific job was to hand out food to the Croatians in refugee camps. The detainee stated he hoped to find a Croatian wife.
- 4) Al Haramain Saudi Arabian foundation's main mission is to implement and teach true Wahhabism religious doctrine worldwide. It has financial connections within Saudi Arabia and maintains connections with other organizations, to include al Qaida.

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- 5) Military reporting indicated in 1994 or 1995 the detainee responsible for the murder with a firearm of United States person, William Jefferson, in Tuzla Canton, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Evidence found in the detainee's home in the village of Zeljezno Polje, Bosnia and Herzegovina included a watch and portable stereo belonging to Jefferson.
- 6) The detainee claimed that while in Bosnia between 1995 and 1997, he was arrested by the Bosnian police after he was involved in a fender bender while driving a car.
- 7) Open source reporting indicated that three automatic rifles, two bombs, two pistols, and a large quantity of ammunition were found in the detainee's vehicle after a traffic accident near Travnik, Bosnia on 22 January 1996.
- 8) Open source reporting indicated the detainee was subsequently imprisoned on illegal weapons charges but was later released in an amnesty for Bosnian Army War Veterans.
- 9) The detainee stated he was sentenced to five years in prison for the traffic accident. The detainee stated he served about seven or eight months in the Bosnian prison located in Newfi Traffic, Bosnia and Herzegovina and then moved to another prison in Mostar, Bosnia for about seven or eight more months.
- 10) The detainee stated he returned to Sana and Mudaidah, Yemen after serving about 15 months of his prison sentence.
- 11) A foreign government source stated that between January and September 1997, in the municipalities of Zenica, Zepce, and Mostare, Bosnia and Herzegovina the detainee together with four others planned the emplacement of an explosive device with a timing mechanism in a "car bomb." The foreign government source stated on 18 September 1997, they took the explosive device from Zeljezno Polje, Bosnia and Herzegovina to Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina where at 2330 hours it exploded at Spltska Ulica, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- 12) Open source reporting indicated the detainee's direct involvement, along with four other Islamic terrorists, in a car bombing that damaged many buildings and injured dozens of people in Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina on 18 September 1997.
- 13) A foreign government source stated during the war the detainee and others were actively involved in criminal activities such as the theft and illegal trade of vehicles, illegal weapons, military equipment and falsified documents.
- 14) The detainee stated about 24 or 25 days before Ramadan, estimated to be approximately October, 2001, he and his friend, Yahiya Khan, decided to travel from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Pakistan to buy motorcycle parts. The detainee claimed Yahiya Khan is

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originally from Karachi, Pakistan and knew the places in Pakistan where he could get these parts cheaply.

- 15) The detainee stated he drove to see his wife in Sanna, Yemen. The detainee stated his wife lived in the Qadasiyah region.
- 16) The detainee stated after three days in Yemen, he flew to Karachi, Pakistan and met Yahiya Khan. The detainee stated they then drove to Lahore, Pakistan and rented a house for three months. The detainee stated he remembers arriving in Lahore, Pakistan 20 days before the beginning of Ramadan. The detainee stated he had 3000 United States dollars that he had planned on using to buy motorcycles and/or motorcycle parts.
- 17) The detainee stated according to his aunt, his female cousin was taken by an Afghani man sometime in the year 2000. The detainee stated his cousin's mother had received information from the Afghani man's brother regarding where his cousin could be found. The detainee stated he told his aunt he would go to Gardiz, Afghanistan and attempt to find and bring his cousin back to Saudi Arabia.
- 18) The detainee stated with the help of Yahiya Khan he found and hired four Pakistani men to go with him to Gardiz, Afghanistan to secure his cousin's release. The detainee stated eventually the family turned over his cousin and they left Afghanistan immediately through Khowst, Afghanistan, then straight on to Lahore, Pakistan. The detainee claimed about a week to ten days after they arrived in Lahor, Pakistan, the Afghan man who originally took his cousin ten months earlier came to Pakistan to take her again. The detainee stated the police in Pakistan immediately arrested him on kidnapping charges. The detainee claimed even though his cousin came forward and told the police he did not kidnap her, they refused to let him go free.
- 19) The detainee stated while in jail in Lahore, Pakistan his money and Saudi passport were taken by the Pakistani police. The detainee claimed the police told him he would be released in about a week. The detainee stated when he asked if he would get his passport and money back, the Pakistani police became angry and turned him over to the American Army.
- 20) The detainee was involved in the attack on the USS COLE.
- 21) Former Mujahedin have connections to the Armed Islamic Group and Gamma Islamiya and the detainee is listed as an individual accused of being a terrorist and to having a connection to Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- 22) An Islamic extremist group, the Armed Islamic Group aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The Armed Islamic Group began its

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- violent activity in 1992 after Algiers voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front, the largest Islamic opposition party, in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991. The group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats.
- 23) Al-Gama'a al-islamiyya, Egypt's largest militant group, has been active since the late 1970s and appears to be loosely organized. The group has an external wing with supporters in several countries worldwide.
- 24) Military reporting stated the detainee worked as a freelance terrorist without specific affiliations to any particular group. The source considers the detainee one of the most dangerous Possible Foreign Islamic Extremists who live in Bosnia and stated the detainee is a field operative.
- 25) Military reporting stated the detainee is a known associate of Islamic extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
- 26) The detainee was a topography trainer at al Farouq Camp.
- 27) The detainee was a member of a terrorist cell in Kuwait that had explosives and weapons and was capable of attacking United States interests.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee was identified as training in Afghanistan about 1990 and 1991 and the detainee was described as the "perfect soldier". The detainee trained at the Sada training camp in Pakistan and at camps in Afghanistan including al Farouq and Khalden.
- 2) The Sada camp was a jihad training facility in the mountains near Peshawar, Pakistan.
- 3) The training camp al Farouq is located in Kandahar, Afghanistan and was visited by Usama bin Laden after 11 September 2001 to celebrate the terrorist attacks on the United States.
- 4) Khalden Camp was co-managed by a suspected member of al Qaida. An entire six-month program at Khalden consisted of light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography, and a tactical course.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) A foreign government source stated the detainee was close to the al Haramain director during the time individuals with suspected connections to al Qaida were employed by

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that organization.

- 2) The detainee was identified as a friend of a convicted Islamic extremist.
  - 3) The detainee was identified as definitely a member of al Qaida.
  - 4) It was identified that a suspected jihadist is a known associate of the detainee and has a long history of terrorist and criminal activities ranging across France, Italy, and Bosnia. The detainee and the jihadist are affiliated with the terrorist group Takvi Ve Hijra, which is connected to the al Qaida network.
  - 5) A document seized during an October 2001 raid on the Albanian of al Waqf al Islami, a Non Governmental Organization, listed the detainee under Administration with a function area of Finance and Support. Al Waqf al Islami's activities and personnel have, on occasion, been linked to terrorist and Islamic extremist groups.
  - 6) The detainee's name, telephone numbers, and address were listed in an al Qaida member's date book, which contained names and some addresses of al Qaida members and Taliban officials.
  - 7) A senior al Qaida lieutenant met with a group of Mujahedin, known as the Zubair Group, of which the detainee was a member.
- d) Intent
- 1) The detainee praised al Qaida and Usama bin Laden, stating bin Laden is a good man, and he is going to kill Americans.
  - 2) The detainee stated he believed the Americans and Saudi Arabians were the same in that they are all criminals.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee claimed the original purpose for traveling to Pakistan was business, not for a fatwa or to fight a jihad. The detainee stated he has no affiliation with the Taliban or al Qaida organizations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or any other country.
  - b) The detainee stated he traveled to Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia during the winter of 1995 and stayed for two years. The detainee claimed he participated in humanitarian relief programs and he hoped to find a Croatian wife.

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- c) The detainee stated everyone suspects he is Mujahedin, which he is not.
  - d) The detainee stated he has never received military training of any kind. The detainee stated he has never owned or carried a weapon.
  - e) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors of future attacks on the United States, or United States interests.
  - f) The detainee stated he has never been arrested and has a clean record with the Saudi government.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

20 December 2007

To: ABDULLAH, IMAD

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDULLAH, IMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he traveled on 8 August 2001, from Sanaa, Yemen, via Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Karachi, Pakistan, and onward to Faisalabad, Pakistan to attend Jamea Salafeyah University.
    - 2) Students at Salafeyah University are encouraged to join the fight in the jihad against the West.
    - 3) The detainee was identified as having moved to Kabul, Afghanistan after training at al Farouq in Afghanistan. The detainee joined the front lines and was asked after fighting on the front lines to become a trainer at one of the camps. The detainee refused to become a trainer.
    - 4) The detainee was identified as an al Qaida recruiter and travel facilitator who helped "fund other individuals' travel" to Afghanistan.
    - 5) The detainee was identified as having been in Pakistan and Afghanistan for training and that the detainee is a member of al Qaida who swore bayat to Usama bin Laden.
  - b) Training

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- 1) The detainee was identified as attending the training camp at al Farouq in Afghanistan.
  - 2) The detainee was identified as receiving combat arms training on the Kalashnikov rifle, pistol and physical fitness training while attending the al Farouq training camp in Afghanistan.
  - 3) The detainee was identified as having trained as a medic while at Tora Bora in Afghanistan.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee was identified as being at the Arab guest houses in Kabul and Kandahar, Afghanistan with other Usama bin Laden body guards.
  - 2) The detainee was identified as one of fifty men at al Farouq in Afghanistan to be Usama bin Laden's body guards.
  - 3) The detainee was identified as being in the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan circa August 2001.
- d) Intent
- 1) The detainee stated that other people think those who fight jihad are heroes and that his time for fighting had not come yet.
  - 2) The detainee stated if the conditions are met, it is the duty of everyone to fight. The detainee stated the conditions require someone to fight in the jihad if Muslims are attacked or if the homeland is attacked. The detainee believes that his homeland has been attacked by the British.
  - 3) The detainee stated he would follow a fatwa that declared jihad because it is the law of the land and he would not question the guidance of his leader. The detainee also stated he would be bound by duty to obey his leader if the leader of his tribe declared Americans to be enemies of Islam, and subsequently ordered their attack.
- e) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee stated "You will never defeat us." However, he did not specify who he was referring to when he said "us."

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- 2) The detainee was arrested at a safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan on 28 March 2002.
- 3) The detainee stated he was arrested with fifteen other men by the Pakistani's at a guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan. Most of the fifteen were Yemenis, along with one Saudi, a Palestinian, a Libyan and a Russian.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a) The detainee stated he never entered Afghanistan.
  - b) The detainee denied ever attending a Taliban or al Qaida training camp. The detainee also denied ever receiving medical training at Tora Bora in Afghanistan.
  - c) The detainee stated he heard about the attacks of 11 September 2001, while he was at the Salafeyah University in Pakistan and it was wrong that so many innocent people were killed.
  - d) The detainee denied the allegation he was involved with the bombing of the USS COLE and stated there is no reason anyone would identify him as being involved with the bombing.
  - e) The detainee stated, if released, he would like to return to Yemen and start a family.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

16 January 2008

To: AL SHARBI, ABDULLAH

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARBI, ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he returned to Saudi Arabia in August of 2000 after attending a University in Arizona.
    - 2) The detainee stated he took a bus from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, in August 2001. From Dubai, the detainee stated he flew to Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated that someone on the flight referred the detainee to stay at the Motel Dubai. The detainee stated he soon found out that the facility was referred to as "the terrorist hotel." The detainee stated he only stayed at Motel Dubai for one night before finding a new place to stay nearby.
    - 3) The detainee stated after moving into a second hotel, he met a man who offered to rent a room to him at his parents house in Karachi, Pakistan. The detainee stated he lived in the house from September 2001 to February 2002. The detainee stated he paid the equivalent of 100 United States Dollars per month in rent. The detainee stated the high cost of rent depleted his funds and that the man became mean when he was unable to pay rent so he looked for another place to live. The detainee stated he then went to a local internet café where he met another man who told the detainee he could help him.

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### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARBI, GHASSAN ABDALLAH GHAZI

- 4) The man he met at the internet café offered the detainee to travel with him to Faisalabad, Pakistan, where the man said he could get the detainee a job. The detainee stated that after arriving in Faisalabad, the man took him to the house where the detainee would later be captured.
  - 5) The detainee stated there were 5 to 6 Pakistanis who ran the house. The detainee stated people would come and go everyday. The detainee stated he was treated as a guest and was told he did not have to pay for anything. The detainee stated he taught English to other residents. The detainee stated he thought the house was being financed by an Arab student society.
  - 6) The detainee stated that following afternoon prayers people at the safe house would gather to read and discuss topics from a book. The detainee stated the topic of discussion would often involve Jihad.
  - 7) The detainee was identified as living at the Faisalabad safe house for less than a week before being captured in the raid. The detainee was identified as being fluent in English and would help teach other residents of the house with their letters and words.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated he received weapons training in the village of Qal' at Bishah, Saudi Arabia. The detainee stated this training included the way to carry and shoot the Kalashnikov rifle. The detainee stated his last weapons training took place between 1991 and 1993 while in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The detainee stated he has fired both pistols and rifles, some of them belonging to his parents. The detainee stated he went to an indoor shooting range in Phoenix, Arizona, during the fall of 1997.
  - 2) He attended a ten day military training camp north of Kabul. At the Kabul camp, the detainee stated he trained on the Kalashnikov machine gun, pistols, grenades and conducted physical training exercises. The camp facility was comprised of abandoned houses.
  - 3) The detainee was selected to receive training on the construction of remote control devices that were to be used to detonate car bombs and the like against American forces in Afghanistan and the Afghan interim Prime Minister, Hamid Karzai. The detainee was also identified to help build remote control devices that could be placed in the United States and detonated by a mobile phone in Pakistan. The training was conducted at a safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

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- 4) The detainee stated the training in Faisalabad, Pakistan, was focused on the use and manufacturing of electronic detonation devices. The purpose of the detainee's training was to allow the detainee to train others how to manufacture and use the electronic bomb detonators. The intended targets of the detainee's electronic bombs were American soldiers.
  - 5) The detainee was identified as being approached by senior al Qaida leadership regarding the opportunity to receive training in electronics in Pakistan. The goal of the detainee's training was to become proficient on the use of remote controlled improvised explosives and then return to Afghanistan where the detainee would train others on how to build and/or use the devices. The detainee was identified as a resident of the Faisalabad, Pakistan safe house.
  - 6) The detainee was identified attending training at the al Farouq training camp circa July to September of 2001.
  - 7) The al Farouq camp was as a basic training camp where trainees learned the basics of weaponry, military tactics, and map reading.
  - 8) The detainee was identified as identified as a translator of instructions, speeches and lessons for other trainees while at al Farouq. The detainee was identified as being selected to perform guard duties during one of Usama bin Laden's visits to the camp. The detainee was identified speaking with Usama bin Laden.
  - 9) The detainee was identified as the individual who helped translate a war manual written in English and writing it in Arabic.
  - 10) The detainee was identified as having received training on the use of explosives at al Farouq.
  - 11) The detainee was identified as attending training at al Farouq. The detainee was identified as having received general weapons training on the PK, Kalashnikov rifle and rocket propelled grenade.
  - 12) The detainee was identified as being an expert in physics and explosives.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee stated the house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, was visited by Daud, also known as Abu Zubaidah. Abu Zubaidah was treated with familiarity at the house.

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- 2) The detainee traveled with the same al Qaida lieutenant and others to Faisalabad, Pakistan. The group's movement was facilitated by a terrorist organization.
  - 3) The detainee was identified as being friends with one the five hijackers onboard American Airlines Flight 77. The detainee was identified as being from the same town as the hijacker and was familiar with the people who recruited the highjacker into al Qaida.
  - 4) The detainee's friend and highjacker was a certified commercial pilot and was identified as the pilot that flew the airliner into the Pentagon on 11 September 2001.
  - 5) The detainee was identified as a member of the al Qaida cell in London, United Kingdom.
- d) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee stated that he chose to attend school in Arizona because he had a relative already living in the area.
  - 2) During a November 1999 flight to Washington D.C., the detainee, along with a suspected al Qaida operative were involved in an incident that caused the flight to be diverted. During the flight, the detainee's companion attempted to gain entrance to the cockpit. The 9/11 Commission concluded that these actions may have been an intelligence gathering operation to test in-flight security measures in anticipation of future al Qaida attacks on United States soil.
  - 3) The detainee's companion from the flight was identified as serving on the board of trustees of an Islamic center while he was a student at a United States university. The detainee's companion was also identified as a chairman of a Saudi student's club at the same university. The detainee's flying companion was arrested in June 2003 on a material witness warrant stemming from his actions onboard the flight and returned to Saudi Arabia in August 2003.
  - 4) The detainee stated during the Presidential debates of 2000 a local news station in Phoenix, Arizona, set up cameras in various locations. The detainee stated he saw one of these cameras in a coffee shop and was asked by a reporter to answer a question about the greatest challenge that the new United States President will face. The detainee stated his answer was that the greatest challenge for the new President would be terrorism, terrorist acts and Usama bin Laden.
  - 5) The detainee stated the attacks of 11 September 2001 were a result of the United States foreign policy and that the United States was just getting what they deserved.

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- 6) The detainee stated he was one of the founding members of the Islamic Student Society at the Embry Riddle Aeronautical University Campus in Prescott, Arizona. The detainee was chosen to be the organizations leader by his roommate. The detainee stated the organization was recognized by the university who encouraged the cultural diversity the detainee's organization brought to the campus. The organization had approximately 15 members and established a location on campus for members to pray. The detainee stated they also handed out literature on Islam to recruit new members.
  - 7) The detainee stated he lived with his roommate from October to December of 1999 and again for a few months in 2000. The detainee stated that the Islamic Student Society never really got going. The detainee's roommate, was identified as the founder of the local Al-Muhajiroun chapter. The detainee was identified by a fellow student as being a member of Al-Muhajiroun, a claim which the detainee denies.
  - 8) Hizb al Tahir is an Islamic fundamentalist group and is represented in the United Kingdom under the name, Hizb al Muhajiroun. Hizb al Tahir calls for the establishment of Islamic states worldwide, for that purpose, people can be smuggled into the sensitive positions in the respective government, or the military in order to overthrow the government and replace it with an Islamic government.
  - 9) The detainee stated his roommate once organized a demonstration on the Embry Riddle campus regarding war crimes against Muslim civilians in Chechnya. The detainee stated he attended the demonstration at the request of his roommate, but that it was a peaceful demonstration conducted with the university's permission.
  - 10) The detainee stated he believes Usama bin Laden has the authority to issue a fatwa.
  - 11) After the attacks on 11 September 2001, the detainee was identified traveling to the former Saudi Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, which served as a large guest house and staging area for counter attacks on Coalition Forces.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee stated the killing of the United States people in retaliation was wrong.
  - b) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001. The detainee denied having any knowledge of rumors or plans for future attacks on the United States and any internal uprisings at the Guantanamo Detention Facility.

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### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL SHARBI, GHASSAN ABDALLAH GHAZI

- c) The detainee stated he was in Pakistan to attend college for a Master's degree.
  - d) The detainee stated that when the Pakistani Police raided the house in Faisalabad, Pakistan that many people fled to the roof, however; the detainee did not resist arrest or threaten the officers.
  - e) The detainee stated that during the 2000 school year FBI agents approached the detainee and asked him questions about his roommate in Arizona. The detainee stated he told the agents that he was not aware of his roommate being involved with any extremist or fundamentalist groups. The detainee stated he was aware of his roommate's affiliation with al-Muhajirun which the detainee believes is a peaceful organization whose goal is the establishment of an Islamic state.
  - f) The detainee stated if he had known that residents of the safe house were fighters, he would have would not have stayed there.
  - g) The detainee stated he was not associated nor did he have any affiliations with fundamentalist groups. The detainee stated he never received military training and has no affiliation with the Taliban, al Qaida or any other terrorist groups.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

14 December 2007

To: AHMED, FAYAD YAHYA

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FAYAD YAHYA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) In 1997 or 1998, the detainee studied under Sheik Muqbil al Wadi at the Demaj Mosque in Sadah, Yemen. The Sheik suggested the detainee travel to Pakistan with the Jamat-al-Tabiligh.
    - 2) The Sheik leads a dangerous group that opposes democracy and has the capacity to destabilize Yemen.
    - 3) The detainee is a Yemeni citizen who traveled to Karachi, Pakistan and Lahore, Pakistan prior to 11 September 2001.
    - 4) The detainee traveled to Pakistan to study and be part of the Jamat-al-Tabiligh.
    - 5) Jamat-al-Tabiligh is a Pakistani-based Islamic missionary organization that is believed to be used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists including members of al Qaida.
  - b) Connections/Associations

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### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AHMED, FAYAD YAHYA

The detainee spent about one and half months at the al Salafia University in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

#### c) Other Relevant Data

- 1) After one month at a house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, the detainee was arrested in a raid by Pakistani police.
- 2) The detainee was arrested at a house which was known to harbor al Qaida members.
- 3) A senior al Qaida operative was the director of the Yemeni guesthouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

#### 4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a) The detainee had no knowledge of al Qaida, the Taliban, or Usama bin Laden outside of what the detainee had learned from the news in Yemen and Pakistan.
- b) The detainee had no knowledge of pending or planned attacks and did not know about the attacks on 11 September 2001 prior to execution.
- c) It was the detainee's understanding that Jamat-al-Tabligh was a group who wanted to prove themselves through good deeds and through the spread of religion.
- d) The detainee explained part of his motivation to go to Pakistan was that the country was strong in religion and commented that studying in Saudi Arabia was too expensive.
- e) The detainee stated he was very upset he was named in an anti-United States poem and that he was not a fighter. The detainee stated the poem was untrue and disputed any association with the 11 September 2001 attacks and those in support of jihad.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

21 December 2007

To: TAHANMATAN, MOHAMMED ABDULLAH

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHANMATAN, MOHAMMED ABDULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he became a member of Jamat-al-Tabligh at 14 years of age. The detainee stated his grandfather and father were also members of Jamat-al-Tabligh.
    - 2) The detainee stated he made two trips to Pakistan. The detainee stated his first trip to Pakistan included an approximate four month stay at the Jamat-al-Tabligh main office in Raiwand, Pakistan.
    - 3) The detainee stated he traveled to Jordan in October 2001, seeking a visa to Pakistan. The detainee stated he turned his passport over to the Jamat-al-Tabligh, who in turn, arranged his visa for travel to Pakistan.
    - 4) The detainee stated upon reaching Pakistan he traveled to Raiwand, Pakistan, to resume his religious training with Jamat-al-Tabligh.
    - 5) The detainee stated he traveled to the Jamat-al-Tabligh headquarters in Pakistan and went on two conversion missions while at the Jamat-al-Tabligh headquarters in Raiwand, Pakistan.

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHANMATAN, MOHAMMED ABDULLAH**

- 6) The detainee stated he traveled with two Afghani members of the Jamat-al-Tabligh to Afghanistan circa February 2001.
  - 7) The detainee stated after traveling to Quetta, Pakistan, he met three Arabs who looked like fighters. The detainee stated that one of the Arabs had a wound on his arm and advised the detainee not to travel to Afghanistan. The detainee, the two Afghans and the Arabs traveled via bus to Lahore, Pakistan.
  - 8) The detainee stated after arriving in Lahore, Pakistan, he separated from the other members of his party and searched for a ride to the Jamat-al-Tabligh headquarters in Raiwand, Pakistan. The detainee stated a Pakistani invited the detainee to travel to his home in Faisalabad, Pakistan. The detainee stayed at the Pakistani's home for two or three days before being taken by the Pakistani to a guest house to stay.
- b) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee was identified as an Afghan Taliban member.
  - 2) An individual the detainee identified as his roommate was captured at a safe house used by a senior al Qaida operative in Faisalabad, Pakistan. During the detainee's time of capture, the detainee's roommate was in the process of constructing circuit boards to be used as timing devices in bombs used against United States forces in Afghanistan.
  - 3) The detainee was identified as being a member of the Jamat-al-Tablighi group, but left to go for training in Afghanistan. The detainee returned to Faisalabad, Pakistan, after the fall of Kabul, Afghanistan.
  - 4) The detainee stated he has two uncles who are associated with Hamas. The detainee stated his uncles are well known among the Hamas organization as well as Israeli authorities having both been arrested numerous times.
  - 5) The detainee stated he was Usama bin Laden's deputy and had struck out at the United States, but then denied having made a comment pertaining to Usama bin Laden. The detainee then stated he wished he had seen Usama bin Laden.
- c) Intent
- 1) The detainee stated the longer he is in Cuba the angrier he becomes, and that he could be killed before he would turn on his brothers.

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### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHANMATAN, MOHAMMED ABDULLAH

- 2) The detainee stated he believes Christians and Jews are his enemies and he must fight them, but he has not picked up any weapons to do so.
- 3) The detainee stated he believes Americans are evil. The detainee mentioned that he hates all enemies of Islam, to include Americans, Jews, Christians and Muslims who don't think like he does.
- d) Other Relevant Data
  - 1) The detainee stated he was living in the guest house for approximately one month before he was arrested by Pakistani police.
  - 2) The detainee was identified as a resident at the Yemeni house in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a) The detainee stated he has no connection to al Qaida or the Taliban, and has no knowledge of past or future terrorist attacks. The detainee stated he has no allegiance to any terrorist organization in the West Bank, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Hamas, or Islamic Jihad. The detainee stated his father has had an ongoing feud with his uncles about their role with Hamas for about twenty years.
  - b) The detainee stated he does not support the use of suicide bombers, and does not believe that individual religious leaders are qualified to issue fatwas.
  - c) The detainee stated his reason to travel to Afghanistan was for a visit only, and that he wanted to visit and observe an Islamic state first hand. The detainee stated he would be interested in living in Afghanistan if it was a true Islamic state.
  - d) The detainee stated he was invited to go to Afghanistan for the purposes of tourism, which he accepted. The detainee stated he was not part of any opposition forces and went to Afghanistan believing that the fighting was not occurring all over the country, but just the areas the detainee was going to stay away from. The detainee stated he was asked to go to Afghanistan for purposes of jihad, but he was not interested in jihad, and had considered going as a tourist.
  - e) The detainee stated he did not observe any weapons or hear any talk of fighting or of the Taliban while staying at the Issa guest house.
  - f) The detainee stated he never actually wanted or intended to fight once he got to Afghanistan.

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF TAHANMATAN, MOHAMMED ABDULLAH**

g) The detainee stated he does not want to return to Palestine because of the ongoing war with Israel. If the detainee is given the opportunity to return to the Middle East, he would like to live in the cities of Mecca or Medina, Saudi Arabia, or in Doha, Qatar. The detainee stated he does not have any family there, but would like to pray and study Islam there.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 January 2008

To: KARIM, ABDUL AZIZ

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NOOFAYAE, ABDALAZIZ KAREEM SALIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he worked for seven months collecting contributions from merchants and businessmen in al Taif, Saudi Arabia. The detainee then took a job for two years earning good wages as an accountant and helping to sell vegetables at his friend's market although he does not recall the market name. Cold weather induced back pain for the detainee and his doctor suggested traveling to Pakistan for treatment. The detainee received his parent's consent and then traveled alone on his first trip out of Saudi Arabia. The detainee stayed in Karachi, Pakistan for two and one-half months while receiving treatment at a hospital where some of the nurses spoke Arabic.
    - 2) The detainee stated he traveled from al Taif, Saudi Arabia to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia by cab and then flew to Damascus, Syria, where he stayed for three days. The next legs of travel by airplane went through Tehran, Iran to Lahore, Pakistan. The detainee stayed for three days before proceeding to Karachi, Pakistan by bus for medical treatment.
    - 3) The detainee's passport states that he was in Oman for eleven months. When questioned regarding this entry, the detainee stated that if the passport was received from a different country, it was probably altered.

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NOOFAYAE, ABDALAZIZ KAREEM SALIM**

- 4) The detainee stayed in a known al Qaida facilitator's guest house in 1997 or 1998 then again in 1999.
  - 5) While receiving treatment, the detainee went to the Raywan Islamic Center in Lahore, Pakistan to study the Koran. He was denied enrollment because he did not have the proper paperwork, but was permitted to stay for one month. Arrangements were made for the detainee to study the Koran at a house in Faisalabad, Pakistan. The detainee stayed in Faisalabad for two months and continued to receive medical care there.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee was at the Crescent Mills house in Faisalabad, Pakistan and trained at Khalden training camp circa 1997 and was in Afghanistan prior to September 11th.
  - 2) The Khalden training camp was a six-month course involving the practical application of light weapons, heavy weapons, explosives, topography, and a tactical element.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) A senior al Qaida lieutenant was captured in March 2002 at a Lashkar-e-Tayyiba safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan suggesting some members of the group are facilitating the movement of al Qaida members in Pakistan. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is the armed wing of a Pakistan-based religious organization, Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-irshad, a Sunni anti-United States missionary organization formed in 1989.
  - 2) An individual at the house in Faisalabad, Pakistan where the detainee was arrested was known to be a member of Jaamat al Tabligh.
  - 3) Tablighi Jamaat, the Preachers of Islam, and also known as Jamat-al-Tabiligh support Islamic terrorist groups in South and Southeast Asia under the cover of conducting religious activities. Recruiters worked undercover as preachers for Jamat-al-Tabiligh and then sent recruited individuals to Afghanistan. Many high-ranking Pakistanis devote part of their annual leave to Jamat-al-Tabiligh and the Pakistani branch has been clandestinely involved in jihad activity. Usama bin Laden used Jamat-al-Tabiligh preachers to communicate instructions.
  - 4) In mid-March, 2002, an individual was taken to the safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan. The individual was brought to this safe house to train several men on the construction of remote control devices that the men would take back to Afghanistan to be used in attacks against Afghan forces.

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NOOFAYAE, ABDALAZIZ KAREEM SALIM**

**d) Intent**

- 1) If released, the detainee stated that he would like to open a fruit store and perhaps get married and start a family anywhere, even America. However, the detainee stated that many Muslims regard Jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam and unbelievers that refuse to convert will be killed because justification for killing infidels is written in the Koran. The detainee further stated that Christians and Jews are enemies of Islam and Usama Bin Laden is a great man. The detainee stated that he would kill Ah'lah Demi, a protected group of non-Muslims, if it were ordered by religious leaders.
- 2) The detainee stated that he believed being a martyr was a great thing and when he was released from custody he intended to become a martyr.
- 3) In a letter addressed to the United States President, the detainee stated, "The Muslims will come soon with their armies and their braves and take over your kingdom."
- 4) In another letter to the United States President, the detainee refers to himself as one of Allah's lions. The detainee adds, "Your destruction will be done by a small group of people called Allah's Lions."
- 5) In a letter addressed to "Muslims everywhere", the detainee referred to himself and other detainees as "the heroes of Muslims everywhere." He espoused support of the Palestinian people in violence against Jews and infidels, and called for Muslims to be prepared for martyrdom.
- 6) In a letter to "America and its allies," detainee stated, "America's end is death and destruction."

**e) Other Relevant Data**

- 1) The detainee refused to provide any specific details regarding what hospitals and physicians he used and approximately what dates he had treatment stating that he had forgotten.

**4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:**

- a) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States before their execution.
- b) The detainee appeared on a list of medium threat detainees considered potential candidates for conditional transfer to Saudi Arabian custody.

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL NOOFAYAE, ABDALAZIZ KAREEM  
SALIM**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 December 2007

To: QADIR, AKHMED ABDUL

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QADIR, AKHMED ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he left his home town of Mukalla, Yemen, in August 1999, and traveled to Sanaa, Yemen, and stayed with his uncle for one month. The detainee stated he left Yemen in approximately September 1999 for Pakistan to learn about the Koran. The detainee's father provided the airline ticket from Sanaa, Yemen, to Karachi, Pakistan, and 850 United States Dollars for living expenses.
    - 2) The detainee stated he stayed in a hotel in Karachi, Pakistan, for two weeks while planning travel to Quetta, Pakistan, to study the Koran at a Tablighi mosque. The detainee stated that while in Karachi, Pakistan, he met a man who agreed to assist the detainee to establish a relief organization in Afghanistan in return for employment in that organization. The detainee stated the two traveled in late September 1999, from Karachi to Quetta, Pakistan, to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee remained there until approximately December 1999. The detainee stated he traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan, in December 1999, then to Quetta, Pakistan, with several Afghanis. The detainee stated he then remained at the Tablighi mosque until February 2000.
    - 3) Some al Qaida members joined the al Dawa al Tabligh religious organization which was well known for its support to jihadist causes. Al Dawa Tabligh is most likely identifiable with the Jamat-al -Tabiligh, a legitimate Islamic Missionary organization based in

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Pakistan and believed to be used as a cover for action by Islamic extremists.

- 4) The detainee stated he traveled in January 2000, to Pakistan for the purpose of learning the Koran and computers. He stated he traveled on Yemeni Airlines to Karachi, Pakistan, with a ticket paid for by his father. The detainee stated he traveled to Quetta, Pakistan, by bus and remained there for 2.5 days. He also stated that one week after arriving in Pakistan he decided to go to Afghanistan to work for a humanitarian organization. The detainee stated he met a man in Karachi, Pakistan, who told him how to illegally enter Afghanistan.
- 5) The detainee stated he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan, where he moved into a house that was owned by an Afghani. He stated that after three months in Afghanistan, he returned to Pakistan. The detainee stated an Arab told him to remain in Pakistan and learn the Koran. He also stated that the Arab was of the al Wafa organization, which the detainee was familiar with.
- 6) The Arab was Director of the al Wafa organization in Afghanistan.
- 7) The non governmental organization al Wafa al Igatha al Islamia has connections to Usama bin Laden and Afghan Mujahedin.
- 8) The detainee stated he spent three months in Quetta, Pakistan, living at the Tabligh Mosque planning to study the Koran. The detainee stated that he returned to Afghanistan, again hoping to find employment with a humanitarian organization. The detainee stated he did not work for al Wafa. The detainee stated he returned to Pakistan because there were more Arabs in Pakistan. The detainee stated he stayed at the Tabligh mosque for approximately four months.
- 9) The detainee stated he lived alone in a house in Kabul, Afghanistan, until approximately May 2000, and again visited the al Wafa office to ask advice on starting his charitable organization. The detainee stated he met with Director of al Wafa again, but he did not provide assistance.
- 10) The detainee stated he returned to Quetta, Pakistan, in May 2000, and stayed at the Tabligh Mosque until September 2000. The detainee stated he traveled back to Kabul, Afghanistan, in September 2000, and stayed in the same house as before. The detainee met an individual and three other Taliban fighters at a market. The detainee stated he was persuaded to accompany the fighters to the rear of the Taliban lines, where he stayed for two days before returning to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he returned to the Taliban lines with a group of Afghani fighters in October 2000. He stated he was issued a loaded AK-47 and, one week later, was taught how to disassemble and shoot the

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weapon.

- 11) The detainee stated he returned to Afghanistan and stayed in the same house he had previously stayed at for approximately two or three weeks. The detainee stated he met three Taliban individuals who suggested that he go to the front line and protect Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he first went to a house and met three Taliban men. The detainee stated he was provided with a Kalashnikov AK-47 and was driven to the front lines where he spent two days before returning to Kabul. The detainee stated he stayed one week in Kabul and then went back to the front for 2.5 to 3 months. The detainee stated he was initially assigned to an Afghan group of soldiers who only spoke Pashtu, but was later transferred to a group of Arab fighters. The detainee stated there were 32 to 35 Arabs in his military group and the detainee was aware that the enemy was General Shah Masoud, leader of the Northern Alliance. The detainee stated he spent nine months on the front lines.
  - 12) The detainee stated while at the house located at the rear of the Taliban lines his activities consisted of cleaning weapons, gathering firewood, cooking, and relaxing. He stated the group possessed an 82 millimeter mortar and a PK rifle. The detainee stated he stayed for three months, then returned his rifle before joining a group of Arab fighters on the Taliban lines in January 2001, and stayed for approximately eight months, until August 2001. The detainee stated he was issued another AK-47 rifle.
  - 13) The detainee stated he went to Pakistan after leaving the Arab house, because he had become tired of the back lines. He stayed for two to three months at a house that belonged to the Salayfia University. A Pakistani was in charge of the house. During his stay there, he did not see any weapons.
  - 14) The detainee stated he returned to Kabul, Afghanistan, became disenchanted, and decided to leave Afghanistan to move on with his life. He also stated it appeared that some people in the community viewed the detainee as a spy.
  - 15) The detainee stated he traveled from the Taliban lines to a house in Kabul, Afghanistan, and stayed until September 2001. The detainee stated he traveled to a house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, where he stayed for approximately three months before the house was raided and the detainee was arrested.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee was identified as a Yemeni who trained at al Farouq in Afghanistan.

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- 2) All students who take the basic training class at al Farouq in Afghanistan got the same type of training that consisted of two weeks each of the following courses: weapons, basic commando, topography, and explosives. The al Farouq training camp was funded by al Qaida and, therefore, was more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan.
- 3) The detainee stated the Taliban invited him to visit the back lines of Kabul, Afghanistan. He accepted the invitation, and he was issued a Kalashnikov and trained on how to use it at the back lines.

#### c) Connections/Associations

- 1) The detainee was identified as having been at a Kabul guest house in 2001. The detainee is the nephew of the individual in charge of the Kabul guest house in which he was residing. The detainee is believed to have attended the al Farouq training camp.
- 2) The detainee's uncle was identified as the man in charge of the guest house and was also a facilitator for fighters traveling to and from the front lines. The detainee's uncle was a member of al Qaida and had sworn bayat to Usama bin Laden. The uncle fought alongside the Taliban on the front line.
- 3) The detainee was identified as having worked under a high ranking al Qaida fighter, who was later promoted to the commander of the paramilitary in Iraq, by Usama bin Laden.
- 4) The detainee was also identified as having worked on the front lines of Afghanistan in support of Usama bin Laden's 55<sup>th</sup> Arab Brigade.
- 5) The detainee was identified as an occupant at the guesthouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
- 6) The detainee was seen at a guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in January or February 2002.
- 7) The detainee was identified as someone at a guesthouse in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
- 8) The detainee was among those individuals captured during a March, 2002 raid of a guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
- 9) The detainee was identified as one of about thirty foreign fighters who fled from Afghanistan. The group was transported in two 16 passenger busses driven by Afghani

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men. The buses had two members of Jamiat Ulema e Islami (JUI) to assist the movement across the border.

- 10) The detainee was identified as having been at a guesthouse in 1999. The guest house was used by Taliban fighters coming from the frontlines and other places and was located in the province of Kaht Bawan, Afghanistan. The individual promoted to paramilitary commander in Iraq by Usama bin Laden was in charge of the guesthouse. The detainee's job was to collect passports and valuables and was at this guest house approximately three to four months.
  - 11) The above mentioned guest house was al Qaida's main guest house, located in Kabul, Afghanistan.
  - 12) The detainee was identified as knowing Usama bin Laden personally and was authorized by Usama bin Laden to carry a special handgun. The detainee served as a guard at the guesthouse and often served as a bodyguard for Usama bin Laden.
  - 13) The detainee was identified as the person who was in charge of securing the passports and documents taken from the al Farouq training camp attendees and guesthouse residents in Kabul, Afghanistan.
  - 14) A listing of names of various al Qaida and Taliban leaders and operatives was provided. The detainee was identified as a Yemeni who traveled to Afghanistan to receive military training whose cover story was that he traveled to Pakistan to engage in religious studies.
- d) Other Relevant Data
- 1) The detainee stated he departed Kabul, Afghanistan, to Khowst, Afghanistan, by car. He wanted to go to the Yemeni Embassy and present his passport, but drove from Khowst, Afghanistan, to Faisalabad, Pakistan. After three days in Faisalabad, Pakistan, the detainee was arrested by the Pakistani Army and detained for an unknown length of time before he was turned over to the United States forces.
  - 2) Al Haramain has been identified as supporting to a certain extent Islamic extremist elements in seventeen countries or regions. Support is not only financial but also consists of freeing activists from prisons, procurement of fraudulent travel documents, support of family members of imprisoned, and providing medical care for wounded Mujahedin. Al Haramain is closely associated with the al Wafa organization and al Qaida.

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF QADIR, AKHMED ABDUL**

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a) The detainee stated he did not have any knowledge of the 11 September 2001, attacks on the New York World Trade Center and Pentagon, nor did he have information of future attacks against the United States.
- b) The detainee stated he had no idea that al Qaida was in Afghanistan until after he was captured. He also stated he never heard anyone talk about al Qaida while he was in Afghanistan.
- c) The detainee stated he never met anyone who was a member of al Qaida in Yemen.
- d) The detainee claimed he did not work for al Wafa.
- e) The detainee stated he did not receive any military training while in Afghanistan. He related the Taliban did not recruit him to fight but did invite him visit the back lines of Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 January 2008

To: SUFYIAN, BARGHOMI

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SUFYIAN, BARGHOMI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) In approximately 1994, while in London, United Kingdom, the detainee heard about the jihad in Afghanistan through the preaching of the imam Umar 'Uthman Mahmud, alias Abu Qatada.
    - 2) The detainee was most likely connected to the Four Feathers Mosque in London.
    - 3) The detainee stated while attending a mosque in London, he saw films about atrocities in Bosnia. The detainee wanted to help the Chechnya people win their freedom and stop the cruel treatment of Muslims in that area.
    - 4) The detainee stated in March 1999 he traveled with a false French passport and an airline ticket to Karachi, Pakistan, using an alias. Upon arriving in Karachi, Pakistan, the detainee purchased another ticket to Peshawar, Pakistan where he stayed at a guest house for three days and then took a bus to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, via Towrkham, Pakistan.
    - 5) The detainee stated that in March 2000 he stayed at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan and a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee wanted to travel to Chechnya, but did not because the borders were too dangerous.

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SUFYIAN, BARGHOMI

- 6) The detainee stated that in August 2000 he traveled to a guest house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. While at the guest house the detainee exchanged his expired passport for an original document with someone else's name, changing the photo.
  - 7) The detainee stated that in November 2000 he returned to the guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan for approximately two weeks.
  - 8) The detainee stated that from June to September 2001 he again traveled between guest houses in Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee again intended to fight in Chechnya but the borders were still too dangerous.
  - 9) The detainee stated that in fall 2001 he crossed the mountains into Pakistan on foot and stayed at a safe house in Waziristan, Pakistan.
  - 10) The detainee stated that in November 2001 he traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan and stayed at a guest house for slightly less than one month.
  - 11) The detainee stated that in December 2001 he went to Lahore, Pakistan and stayed at numerous places.
  - 12) When the detainee heard about the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the detainee immediately celebrated.
  - 13) The detainee fought with other Mujahedin against Coalition forces during the latter part of 2001 in Afghanistan, including Tora Bora in December 2001.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated in 1999 he trained at a small training camp between Jalalabad, Afghanistan and Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee received training on the AK-47 assault rifle and other small arms as well as Russian and Chinese made mines. While practicing mine defusion the detainee lost four fingers on his left hand.
  - 2) The detainee stated that from September or October 1999 until March 2000 he trained at the Khalden Camp located outside of Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee received training on light arms, tactical movement, land navigation, artillery, mortars, and radio communication. The detainee also took an informal indoctrination class. The detainee watched movies about the struggle and tactics used in Chechnya.
  - 3) The detainee stated that in June 2000 he returned to the guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan for approximately two months, where he was introduced to three Afghans. The detainee trained the Afghans on tactics and training he learned at the Khalden

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### Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SUFYIAN, BARGHOMI

#### Camp.

- 4) The detainee stated that in winter 2000 he went to a camp at Khowst, Afghanistan, where he was a trainer for approximately six or seven months.
  - 5) The detainee was identified as an al Qaida networks electronics and explosives trainer who used email to communicate with other al Qaida operatives.
  - 6) The detainee was a trained remote controlled device specialist who also had training in car bombs, explosives, and small arms.
  - 7) The detainee was identified as an Algerian who used to be an explosives trainer in Afghanistan.
  - 8) The detainee was identified as the top battlefield tactics trainer in Tora Bora, teaching woodland and mountain tactics, small explosives, hand grenades, land mines, and first aid.
  - 9) The detainee provided remote control explosives training in preparation for attacks against the forces of Afghanistan's Interim Prime Minister Hamid Karzai.
  - 10) The detainee was identified as an Algerian in charge of the explosives and electronic detonator training.
  - 11) The detainee was identified as the instructor of a remote controlled explosives course.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee's alias was included on an al-Qaida membership list recovered from a computer disk. The disk was found at a home of deceased al-Qaida chief military commander Muhammad Atif, also known as, Abu Hafs al Masri.
  - 2) An Islamic extremist group, the Armed Islamic Group aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The Armed Islamic Group began its violent activity in 1992 after Algiers voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front, the largest Islamic opposition party, in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991. The group uses assassinations and bombings, including car bombs, and it is known to favor kidnapping victims and slitting their throats.
  - 3) The detainee was identified as having had a relationship with Usama bin Laden.

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## **UNCLASSIFIED**

### **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SUFYIAN, BARGHOMI**

- 4) The detainee, a known explosives trainer, was tasked to provide explosives detonator training at a safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan in 2002. The detainee was given a sum of money, possibly 400 United States Dollars, to purchase the remote control device parts used in the training.
  - 5) The detainee was seen with al Qaida's second most senior explosives specialist in early 2001 in Kabul, Afghanistan, who sought the detainee's expertise in the development of remote control devices.
  - 6) The detainee traveled with Arab fighters during their escape from Afghanistan to Faisalabad, Pakistan.
  - 7) In summer 2001, the detainee was asked if the detainee could construct a remote control device that would detonate an explosive in the United States using a mobile phone in Afghanistan.
- d) Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated that in February 2002 he traveled to a safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, where he stayed for a period of time before his capture.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

The detainee denied providing explosives training to anyone at the safe house and denied being asked to provide this training. The detainee stated he was never considered a teacher to anyone, despite previous admissions of conducting training in Afghanistan. When confronted with information from other detainees about him, the detainee called them liars. The detainee claimed to have passed the time eating and drinking at the safe house and he did not consider anyone at the house to be violent or dangerous.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

19 December 2007

To: MAHJOUB, OMAR KHALIF MOHAMMED ABU BAKER

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHJOUB, OMAR KHALIF MOHAMMED ABU  
BAKER

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he was recruited by his cousin in about 1994 to work for the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
    - 2) The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group is a terrorist organization that declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization or are active in the international Mujahedin network.
    - 3) The detainee was a member of the military commission of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
    - 4) The detainee stated security increased following Usama bin Laden's visit to a training camp and he was placed in charge of a guard post behind the camp. The detainee stated that after security increased following Usama bin Laden's visit to a training camp Jalalabad, he was placed in charge of a guard post behind the camp. The detainee commanded five men during daylight hours and 20-30 men at night.

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHJOUN, OMAR KHALIF MOHAMMED ABU BAKER**

- 5) The detainee stated that at the end of 1998, he went to the Taliban to offer his services to fight the Northern Alliance.
  - 6) The detainee stated the leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group arranged a job for him in Khartoum, Sudan. The detainee worked overseeing Sudanese drivers for one of Usama bin Laden's transportation companies.
  - 7) The detainee was identified as Omar the Libyan and on the front lines near Taloqan, Afghanistan, fighting the Northern Alliance in 2001. The detainee was also identified as a military leader in charge of many Arabs from Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and other Gulf States while on the front lines and would meet with the other Taliban leaders to plan military operations. The detainee was further identified as having trained another fighter on the use of anti-aircraft weapons.
  - 8) The detainee was identified as an instructor at a camp in Afghanistan and a front line leader. The detainee was also identified as providing training on 32mm anti-aircraft weapons, training mines, rocket propelled grenades, and tactics to Libyan and Tanzanian fighters and to other instructors. The detainee was identified as someone whom others would approach to receive explosives training if they wanted to commit a terrorist act.
  - 9) When the detainee offered his services to the Taliban in 1998, he was asked to join a group clearing mines. While clearing a road for the Taliban to advance, the detainee stepped on a mine that detonated and caused the loss of his right leg.
  - 10) The detainee was identified as the leader of a Libyan training camp ten kilometers from Kabul, Afghanistan.
  - 11) The detainee was identified as a trainer and leader at the Libyan training camp near Kabul, Afghanistan.
  - 12) The detainee was identified as having stayed at the Ashara guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan.
  - 13) According to a senior al Qaida operative who controlled three Arab guest houses in Kabul, Afghanistan, the Ashara guest house was a transition point for Arabs going to and coming from either the training camps or frontline areas. The Ashara guest house received funding from the Taliban and al Qaida.
- b) Training

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHJOUB, OMAR KHALIF MOHAMMED ABU BAKER**

- 1) In June 1997, the detainee was in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, for about three weeks before he went to the Jihad Wahl Camp for six months. The detainee also instructed explosives at the al Farouq Camp during the time he lived and worked at Jihad Wahl.
- 2) The detainee stated trainees only went to Jihad Wahl for specialization in ambush techniques after receiving basic military skills at the al Sadiq camp. The detainee worked in the carpentry shop inside al Sadiq camp, building props for ambush technique instruction at Jihad Wahl. The detainee also filmed Jihad Wahl training sessions.
- 3) At the end of the 40-day basic program, al Qaida selected the most promising trainees from the basic course for more advanced training and specialized coursework at either al Sadiq or Jihadwal camps.
- 4) The detainee stated that at Jihad Wahl camp, he was taught such things as planning attacks, setting up missions, organizing a resistance cell, leadership, politics, and reasons for the success or failure of past jihad operations. The detainee stated he was also taught about explosive devices and heavy artillery.
- 5) The detained stated that while he was recovering from having his leg crushed in an accident in Sudan, he went to a Libyan house where weapons and explosives training took place. The detainee stated he could not move due to his injuries, but was able to take the training.
- 6) The detainee stated he attended a training camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, and the purpose of the camp was to prepare fighters to go back to Libya and change the current regime. The detainee stayed at the camp for approximately two months and was trained in weapons like the AK-47, PK, DSHKA, and hand grenades.
- 7) The detainee stated he received training on Kalashnikov rifles, PK's, Doshka anti-aircraft weapons, and grenades at the camp in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
- 8) The detainee stated that he left Sudan in 1995 and traveled to Jalalabad and Kabul and wanted to go to Khowst, Afghanistan, to attend the Khalden Training Camp. Since the detainee lacked the required permission to attend the Khalden camp, he instead attended the Jihad Wahl Camp, where he arrived in early 1996.
- 9) The detainee stated he was in Afghanistan from 1998 to 2001, and a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, he was trained on the Kalashnikov rifle, pistol, rocket propelled grenade, and anti-aircraft weapons.

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHJOUB, OMAR KHALIF MOHAMMED ABU BAKER**

**c) Connections/Associations**

- 1) The detainee stated that while at the Libyan house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, he spoke extensively with an Egyptian about tactics, front line fighting, and Taliban structure. The Egyptian with whom the detainee spoke was in charge of the security committee for Usama bin Laden.
- 2) The detainee was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and provided instruction on topography and explosives at the al Farouq training camp.
- 3) The al Farouq training camp is funded by al Qaida and is more advanced than other training camps in Afghanistan.
- 4) The detainee was seen with Abu Musab al Zarqawi.
- 5) The detainee stated he met Abu Musab al Zarqawi on two occasions. The first time the detainee encountered Zarqawi was at the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group house in 2000 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The second occasion occurred when the detainee saw Zarqawi standing outside of Zarqawi's house in the Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood in Kabul, Afghanistan, in March 2001.
- 6) The detainee stated he met Aiman al Zawahiri twice by chance, but detainee does not recall exactly where he met al Zawahiri.
- 7) The detainee was identified as very friendly with and close associate of Mullah Bilal. Bilal was a senior member of al Qaida and the planner and strategist behind the USS Cole bombing in Yemen in October 2000.

**d) Other Relevant Data**

- 1) The detainee was identified as being aware of the signals to initiate the 11 September 2001 attacks before they began.
- 2) The detainee was arrested in a guest house in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in February 2002.
- 3) The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to obtain military experience and weapons training and was not an instructor or a military leader.
- 4) The detainee stated he was provided with a fake passport but he did not use it as he was ordered to go to Afghanistan

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHJOUB, OMAR KHALIF MOHAMMED ABU BAKER**

- 5) The detainee stated he had initially lied about his leg amputee injury by stating that it was non-combat related. The detainee stated there was an agreement between all of the detainees at Camp Delta not to tell the truth about anything. The detainee stated he is now being truthful and fought on the front lines for one week until he was injured.
  - 6) The detainee was identified as Omar the Libyan, who was on the front lines in late 1999 fighting with the Taliban against the Northern Alliance near Mir Bachel Kowt, Afghanistan. The detainee was brought in to clear mines so that the Taliban could advance. The detainee was identified as having his right leg cut off by one of the mines.
  - 7) The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group on the front lines at Bagram had direct communication with Usama bin Laden. The Libyan fighters, al Qaida and the Taliban had the same ideology; which was to demolish the Northern Alliance and the Americans physically and psychologically.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a) The detainee denied being at Taloqan or any place north of Kabul or Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee also stated he never fought against the Northern Alliance or the Americans and that he had never been at the al Farouq Training Camp.
  - b) The detainee denied being associated with or being a member of the Taliban or al Qaida.
  - c) The detainee denied he was chosen for explosives training at the Yahya camp.
  - d) The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001, and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans for future attacks on the United States or its interests.
  - e) The detainee stated he and many other Muslims believe that what Usama bin Laden did was wrong.
  - f) The detainee stated that he has no problem with the United States and does not plan to use what he learned during training to attack the United States.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

16 January 2008

To: AL QAHTANI, JABRAN SAID BIN WAZAR

**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE**  
**REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, JABRAN SAID BIN WAZAR**

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a) Commitment
    - 1) The detainee stated he originally planned on joining the Mujahedin in Chechnya to fight the Russians, but changed his mind following the events of 11 September 2001.
    - 2) The detainee stated he was already interested in jihad when he approached a recruiter, who he saw in an internet café viewing a site concerned with jihad in Chechnya.
    - 3) The detainee stated he decided in October 2001 to help his Muslim brothers fight against the Americans after learning of the September 11 terrorist attacks. The detainee stated he believed the Americans were coming to Afghanistan on a crusade of Christianity against the Taliban and Muslims. The detainee stated he met Abu Abdallah, who gave the detainee the phone number of a contact in Iran who could assist the detainee in joining al Qaida.
    - 4) The detainee stated he flew from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to Damascus, Syria. The detainee stated he then flew to Tehran, Iran then drove to Mashhad, Iran. The detainee stated he then contacted the person at the phone number provided by Abu Abdallah. The contact took the detainee to a guest house in Mashhad, Iran.

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## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, JABRAN SAID BIN WAZAR**

- 5) The detainee stated the safe house in Mashhad, Iran, was used by al Qaida members.
  - 6) The detainee stated he then took a taxi to the Afghanistan border, where he was arrested by Iranian authorities because they thought he was in the country illegally. After he was released, the detainee convinced an Iranian soldier to assist him in crossing the border into Afghanistan. Once in Afghanistan, the detainee was given a ride by the Taliban to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he then went on to Kabul, Afghanistan.
  - 7) The detainee stated he went to the battlefield to help fight the Northern Alliance forces. The detainee stated he was on the battlefield a few days before retreating to the mountains. The detainee stated he left the mountains and traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he then traveled to Khost, Pakistan then Lahore, Pakistan.
  - 8) The detainee stated he learned that the Saudi Arabian government had been informed the detainee had been in Afghanistan. The detainee stated he remained in Lahore, Pakistan for two months trying to get his passport fixed, fearing he would be arrested in Saudi Arabia for having an Afghanistan stamp in his passport. The detainee stated it was during this time he met Zubayda. The detainee stated he went to Zubayda's house in Faisalabad, Pakistan and stayed there waiting for Zubayda to fix the detainee's passport.
  - 9) The detainee was identified as having gone to Afghanistan after September 11, 2001 to train and support the jihad. The detainee was seen at a safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
- b) Training
- 1) The detainee stated he attended a training camp outside of Kabul, Afghanistan where he learned to shoot Kalashnikov and PK rifles, and how to use hand grenades.
  - 2) The detainee stated he trained at a camp in Faisalabad, Pakistan. The detainee stated this training focused on the use and manufacture of electronic detonation devices. The detainee stated his ultimate goal was to go with a senior al Qaida lieutenant to train others on the manufacture and use of electronic bomb detonators. The detainee stated the electronic bombs were to be used against the American soldiers.
  - 3) The detainee stated he was tasked by a senior al Qaida operative to receive electronics and explosives training with another senior al Qaida lieutenant in Pakistan and then return to Afghanistan to act as a trainer in the same fields.
  - 4) The detainee understood he was to receive electronics training in remote controlled improvised explosives and then return to Afghanistan to train Afghans how to build and/or use the devices.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, JABRAN SAJD BIN WAZAR**

- 5) The detainee was taken to Pakistan to receive training on making and using remote control devices for use in explosives. The goal of this training was for the detainee to return to Afghanistan in order to use the remote control devices to detonate car bombs and the like against the forces of Afghan interim Prime Minister Hamid Karzai.
  - 6) The detainee was taken from Birmel, Afghanistan to a safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan. Arrangements were made for a trainer to teach the detainee how to make and use the remote controls at the safe house.
  - 7) The detainee was identified as being present during English language classes at the safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan.
- c) Intent
- 1) The detainee stated he is a terrorist.
  - 2) The detainee stated he wanted to fight on the frontlines against the Northern Alliance, so he could die a martyr faster. The detainee stated if an individual killed oneself along with an enemy, then this was acceptable in Islam.
  - 3) The detainee expressed a desire to kill the president of Afghanistan and King Fahad of Saudi Arabia. The detainee stated this was duty because they were Americans.
  - 4) The detainee stated participating in jihad was his holy duty as a Muslim. The detainee stated he felt his personal Jihad would be successful if he could walk up to his enemy with a hand grenade, pull the pin and kill both himself and his enemy.

d) Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated he was captured at a safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan with other electrical engineers, explosives specialists, electronics equipment, and handwritten training manuals. The detainee stated he had written one of the training books in the house.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a) The detainee denied any involvement with al Qaida, other terrorist organizations, or bomb making.
- b) The detainee recanted his statement that he wrote one of the training manuals found in the house in which he was captured.

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**Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL QAHTANI, JABRAN SAID BIN WAZAR**

c) The detainee denied going to Afghanistan to obtain training. The detainee denied any knowledge of explosive devices in the safe house in which he was captured.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense**  
**Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy**  
**Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

16 January 2008

To: MUTI-ZAHRAN, MOHAMMED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUTI-ZAHRAN, MOHAMMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a) Commitment

- 1) The detainee served as a fighter against the Northern Alliance.
- 2) The detainee stated he is committed to the idea of jihad and his mission is to fight as a soldier of god against other soldiers.
- 3) The detainee stated he decided to go fight jihad after a fatwa was issued declaring jihad should be waged against Americans.
- 4) The detainee stated he is honored as a man to belong to al Qaida.
- 5) The detainee approached a recruiter to join the jihad.
- 6) The detainee admitted to being proud he was a low-level Taliban fighter.
- 7) The detainee stated he was involved in the planning for the assassination of the leader of the Northern Alliance.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## **Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUTI-ZAHRAN, MOHAMMED**

- 8) The detainee stated he participated in surveillance missions to plan the assassination of an Afghanistan commander.
- 9) The detainee stated he joined al Qaida because he respected the organization as a group and its individual members.
- b) Training
  - 1) The detainee attended the Khalden Camp in Afghanistan for pistol training.
  - 2) The Khalden Camp trained students how to use a Kalashnikov, followed by other automatic weapons. The trainees took special courses, such as an explosives course. These courses took approximately seven to eight months.
  - 3) The detainee stated he attended the al Farouq Camp and received training in anti-aircraft weapons.
  - 4) The al Farouq Camp took 45 days, and was a basic training course. It involved a preparation course that covered all types of topics, such as weapons, topography, field guns, first aid, and explosives.
  - 5) The detainee stated he was trained on numerous light weapons systems to include Kalashnikov rifle, hand grenades, rocket propelled grenades, anti-personnel mines, and light machine guns at an Algerian guest house.
  - 6) The detainee stated he attended a six month explosives training course at an Algerian guest house.
  - 7) The detainee stated he fought on the front lines in Afghanistan and continued his training using manuals and actual enemy contact.
  - 8) The detainee stated he attended sniper training.
  - 9) The detainee stated he was trained by a senior al Qaida operative on explosives, battlefield tactics and enemy territory infiltration.
  - 10) The detainee stated he was trained how to turn a radio into an improvised explosive device.
  - 11) The detainee stated that as an al Qaida member, he attended an advanced explosives training course in the mountains of Afghanistan.

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## Subject: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MUTI-ZAHARAN, MOHAMMED

- 12) The detainee stated he attended special nighttime training camps in Afghanistan.
  - 13) The detainee stated he and one of the 11 September 2001 hijackers, trained for nighttime combat in Afghanistan.
  - 14) The detainee stated he was trained in the use of codes and communications equipment and on the use of mobile, fixed, and wireless battlefield communications systems.
  - 15) The detainee stated he attended an al Qaida special operations training with one of the 11 September 2001 hijackers for approximately 18 months. The detainee received specialized training that included kidnappings and assassinations, bombings, poisons, weapons training and suicide missions.
  - 16) The detainee stated he received training to perform attacks from moving cars and motorcycles during darkness.
  - 17) The detainee was also trained in assassinations, rappelling, hand-to-hand combat, and the use of video simulation.
  - 18) The detainee stated he attended training at an Algerian House in Afghanistan and received RPG and firearms training.
  - 19) The detainee stated he attended a school for electrical technicians to learn how to carry out attacks by means of explosions.
  - 20) The detainee provided training on infiltration techniques and clandestine reconnaissance missions.
  - 21) The detainee stated he was specially selected to attend advanced explosives training because he attended previous explosives training.
- c) Connections/Associations
- 1) The detainee knew an 11 September 2001 hijacker and they studied the Kuran, jihad, and law together in Saudi Arabia.
  - 2) The detainee stated he was friends with an 11 September 2001 hijacker.
  - 3) The detainee stated he met with an initial al Qaida screener who made arrangements for the detainee to travel to Afghanistan.

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